ESSAYS
COMMERCIAL and POLITICAL,
ON THE
REAL and RELATIVE INTERESTS
OF
IMPERIAL and DEPENDENT STATES,
Particularly those of
GREAT BRITAIN
AND
Her DEPENDENCIES:
Displaying the PROBABLE CAUSES of, and a Mode of compromising the present
DISPUTES
Between this Country and her
AMERICAN COLONIES.
To which is added,
An APPENDIX,
ON THE MEANS OF
EMANCIPATING SLAVES,
Without LOSS to their
PROPRIETORS.

The SECOND EDITION.

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PREFACE.

AS many publications on the *ſubject of the American conteſt* have already appeared to the world, ſome apology is neceſſary for the intruſion of any thing further: However, if *that ſubject* be placed in a new light, I hope it will be deemed a ſufficient reaſon for offering this treatiſe to the public.

After illuſtrating the advantage Great Britain derived from the commerce of each Colony reſpectively, with the probable cauſes of the inſurrection, and to whoſe charge it ought to be laid, I have endeavoured to point out the ſpecific difference, and conſequences of exerciſing the right of *laying on duties in general* or *port duties only*, and to ſhew that the intereſt of the empire requires, that our fellow-ſubjects in America ſhould be *exempt from all taxation but external*, and that, in conſequence of this exemption, the American Colonies *be further reſtrained in their navigation and fiſheries than they lately were.* The *regulation of the commerce of its Colonies, and right of impoſing external duties*, it is proved this country has, conſiſtent with the very nature of colonization, enjoyed from the beginning: How far the exerciſe of thoſe powers may render all (even the northern Colonies, who rival us in export) advantageous, is largely treated on.

The conſequences to us of the independence of all, or part of our American Colonies are explained; as likewiſe how deeply the other European ſtates are intereſted in the event.

The neceſſity of, and happy conſequences attending an union with Ireland; the improvement of the revenue in Scotland, and means of increaſing the fiſheries of the Britiſh iſles, are particularly treated of: And laſtly, I have endeavoured to ſhew, that the Britiſh poſſeſſions in Aſia, might, by proper management, be rendered far ſuperior to all we ever held in America.

As I have, with ſome ſeverity, animadverted on the Americans retaining, notwithſtanding their own cry for liberty, their fellow-creatures in *perpetual ſlavery*, I thought it highly neceſſary, not only to decry this evil, but to point out a remedy, and one of ſuch a nature, as ſhould not claſh with the intereſts of thoſe whom the laws allow to oppreſs a part of their ſpecies; for this reaſon, I have added an Appendix on the Manumiſſion of Slaves, which, without this obſervation, might appear foreign to the ſubject of this treatiſe—Should this mode of emancipation take place, even only in a few plantations, I ſhall eſteem myſelf happy in being the fortunate means of promoting the liberty of ſuch a part of my fellow-creatures.

I am not conſcious of being prejudiced in favour of the one party or the other in the preſent unhappy conteſt with our American Colonies; at leaſt I have endeavoured to be impartial, and believe I am actuated by a ſincere love of my country, and earneſt regard for the well-being of the whole empire.

I will not venture to ſay this treatiſe is free of errors, but hope that a variety of other avocations which demanded my attention will be a ſufficient plea in my favour for any miſtakes that may be found.

Since this book went to the preſs I have peruſed "Governor Pownal's Letter to Adam Smith, L. L. D. "F R.S. on the ſubject of his *Enquiry into the natural "Cauſes of the Wealth of Nations.*" Now as I have made the *free import and export of proviſions* the baſis of many advantages to be derived to the empire, I am ſorry, that although in moſt other points I agree with the Governor, we ſhould in this ſo widely differ.

In page 29 of the Governor's Letter we read, "You "think the reſtraints on live cattle and corn an unrea- "ſonable and ungenerous monopoly, in that the grazing "and farming buſineſs of Great Britain could be but "little affected by a free importation of theſe, and not "in the leaſt hurt. As, on the contrary, I think, any

"change

" change in this part of our ſyſtem might be attended " with the moſt important conſequences, eſpecially to a " claſs of people, who bear the chief burthen of all the " taxes, and are the ſupport of the ſtate of the commu- " nity. I own I tremble for the change, and ſhould " hope this matter may be a little more thoroughly ex- " plored in all the effects of its operation, before any " ſuch idea becomes a leading doctrine."

As in the body of this work, the 4th and 9th ſections eſpecially, I have pointed out the neceſſities of, and advantages to be derived from *an abſolute free import and export of corn, cattle, and proviſions*, and have at the ſame time ſhewn that the fears of the landholders are groundleſs, and that, on the contrary, they in the end would be great gainers by the continuance of ſuch free import and export, it will be here unneceſſary to recapitulate all thoſe arguments.

I ſhall only obſerve, that Governor Pownal has, in my opinion, fallen into that error long ſince endeavoured to be exploded, " that the landed and commer- " cial intereſts of the kingdom are different."—On this erroneous principle he evidently prefers the landed intereſt to every other in the ſtate beſides, and, in this, follows a direct contrary ſyſtem to that of the French, who on the other extreme of the ſame falſe principle, ſacrifice the landed intereſt to what they think to be the commercial. They almoſt uniformly * prohibit the exportation of grain, that their manufacturers may never be in want of it, and always have it low. But herein (a corroboration of the landed and commercial intereſt being the ſame) they defeat the very purpoſes they deſign to promote.—The farmer in a good crop having no vend for his ſurplus, and fearful that the next may be as good, is anxious to diſpoſe of what he has;—thus more being offered at market than is wanted, occaſions the whole to fall ſo low, that the cultivators of the earth are ſcarce

* In 1764 an edict was iſſued, permitting a free commerce in grain; but in the latter part of 1767 the export was again totally prohibited.

paid

paid for their labour; this occaſions, perhaps the next year, a neglect of a culture ſo diſadvantageous—the crop proves ſhort—prices riſe, and they have recourſe to importation: thus the landholders ſuffer, and the nation is drained of riches, to ſupply what their own ſoil would have afforded them; at the ſame time that they prevent the influx of ſpecie that would, in conſequence of a free market, have been drawn from the export of their ſurplus.

Although there are in every country large tracts not in culture, which would ſoon be under cultivation were mankind to exert their natural right of uſing theſe gifts of nature that are unoccupied or neglected by other men, we ſhall not contend about it, becauſe the regulation of *civil compact* has entirely ſet it aſide.

In this ſtate, all that can be expected is, that thoſe who have aſſumed or acquired to themſelves the property of the ſoil, ſhould exact no more from thoſe who offer to labour it, or to purchaſe its produce, than the *real* value; that is, what in ſimilar circumſtances is practiſed by the landholders of the neighbouring nations: and as there would always be a competition of landholders offering to ſale the uſe of the ſoil or the produce of it, they never could demand or acquire more than the natural value ariſing *from ſituation, and different numbers of inhabitants to conſume it*, were the market left free and open; but when we ſee the landholders of any country combining to compel the people of that ſtate to take the produce, or rent their lands at their own price—the world muſt allow it to be unreaſonable—to be unjuſt—let them palliate it by what pretences they will. The reader need not be told this is the caſe in Britain—if he know it not, let him read the late act* boaſted by the landholders, as an act of generoſity and diſintereſtedneſs: I muſt again repeat, in reſtraining the free commerce of the neceſſaries of life, they ſee not their own intereſts.

* 13 Geo. III. Chap. 43.

Now

Now as to the other part of the ſentence quoted from the governor "that this ſyſtem would be productive of "the moſt important conſequences to a claſs of people "who bear the chief burthen of the taxes, and are the "ſupport of the ſtate of the community." If about two millions the produce of the land tax at the higheſt, at 4s. in the pound, be the chief part of twelve millions, the ſum raiſed in the kingdom, the governor's aſſertion is true; or if he can prove that the taxes on conſumption, that are paid by the landed intereſt, in common with the reſt of the people, exceed four millions for their quota—a very probable circumſtance! then we may believe that the landed intereſt pay the chief or principal part of the taxes.

Who ought to bear a principal portion of the taxes? They who are moſt intereſted in the population of the kingdom; and who are they but the landed intereſt, eſpecially thoſe in the interior parts of the country? For what would their lands be worth without a ſale at hand for their products, too heavy to bear a charge of long tranſportation, and is not the principal conſumption afforded by the *manufactures* in the inland towns? Therefore an *increaſe*, not a *decreaſe* of theſe *conſumers* is evidently their intereſt. The certain way to bring about the *latter*, is to overcharge thoſe people with taxes, and by a *monopoly* to compel them to take the produce of the land at the land-worker's price. If this event is to be avoided, it follows that the *landholders ſhould bear a conſiderable portion of the taxes of the ſtate, and allow a free commerce of the neceſſaries of life.*

I am no advocate for the landed intereſt paying more than they do, but only mean to ſhew, that they ſhould not, in conſequence of what they do pay, imagine they have a right to make every intereſt in the kingdom ſubſervient to what ſome of them falſely eſteem their own; and for that purpoſe we will compare the burthens of the neighbouring nations.

In France, the landed intereſt, beſides being diſtreſſed by the non-allowance to export their produce (wine ex-

excepted) pay in the taille and capitation taxes a capital part of the revenue, and ſuffer ſtill more by the oppreſſive manner in which theſe taxes are collected.

There the amount paid in taxes, compared to what is paid in general to the landholders, is in the proportion of 5 to 3, that is ⅜ths of the whole, or 12s. 6d. in the pound, whereas what is paid in Britain, on an average, does not exceed 2s. when the land-tax is at the higheſt, 4s. in the pound;—a ſtriking difference!

In Spain, although the taxes are not eſteemed high, yet in moſt lands * what is paid to the government exceeds what is paid to the landlord, conſequently the tax, their very fertile lands excepted, is above 10s. in the pound.

Mr. Pownal ſays, the free import will ſtop improvements. On the contrary, we may expect from its conſequences that it will haſten them, particularly in the interior parts of the country where they are moſt wanted, becauſe the reſult of proviſions being uniformly moderate, will be *a lowering of all wages, an extenſion of, or greater demand for, our manufactures and conſequent increaſe of people*, the laſt of which affording conſumption for every particular of the earth's produce, will occaſion it to be cultivated.

Another point this author is afraid of is, that our farmers, burthen'd in war with increaſed taxes, will meet with a competition, of the ſame articles they raiſe, from countries leſs heavily taxed. It is no eaſy matter to find a European country where the land in proportion to its value is leſs heavily taxed by the government, though

* The taxes in Spain that may be accounted land-taxes, are (that part of) the MILLONES, which conſiſt of ¼th of the wine, beſides a pecuniary tax on it; and ſome impoſts on fleſh and oils, SERVICIO AND MONTAZGO, a tax upon the flocks of ſheep that come in to or go out of the paſtures at the end of winter and ſpring; and the VALIMIENTOS, conſiſting of a third and a tenth of the herbage of the paſtures of private perſons.

DON GERONYMO DE UZTARIZ, on the Theory and Practice of Commerce and Maritime Affairs.

there

there may be ſome countries leſs taxed by the *land proprietors*. This competition of foreign produce (neceſſaries of life) is not to be feared, when we conſider the vaſt amount of interior carriage in moſt of the countries exported from, the riſks and damages of the ſea, with expence of freight and other charges, excluſive of inland carriage at home, before it can poſſibly effect the inland interior conſumption.

The Governor further ſays, *the continued influx of riches* into England for near a century paſt, has created a continued progreſſive riſe in prices *which diſtreſſes the land-workers and owners*. So far from this, the landholders have been greatly benefited by this influx of riches, not only by their rents being greatly raiſed, but the value of their lands being improved in a yet far greater proportion, fetching now thirty years purchaſe or upwards, inſtead of ten or fifteen, in the beginning of this century. Beſides, it is not the influx of money into this kingdom that has riſen the prices of our own internal produce and manufactures, but the ill-judged monopoly of the produce of the earth, or neceſſaries of life, which, by being raiſed, have raiſed the price of labour, the principal conſtituent part in every manufacture, or *laboured-compoſite-article*, which again has operated on theſe very productions of the earth, ſo as to deſtroy all advantages the monopolizers propoſed to themſelves from the raiſing of them.

The influx of riches into any kingdom *where the commerce in the neceſſaries of life is free*, can operate no further in the advance of price *than as far as it increaſes the general average of the circulating maſs of riches in the commercial world*. The illuſtration is eaſy. We will ſuppoſe, that in a kingdom reſtrained from all foreign or external commerce, the inhabitants of a particular province, had, from mines in their poſſeſſion, or any peculiar cauſe, acquired a great influx of money, far beyond their proportion; it would, from the greater ſums to ſpend, attract people from the other provinces; but would *this province only* experience a riſe in prices,

or would it not actuate the whole provinces of the kingdom in *the direct proportion this acceſſion of circulating riches of the one province bore to the aggregate in the whole?* And where freedom of commerce in the neceſſaries of life is allowed, one ſtate is to the commercial world, what, in the above inſtance, a province is to a kingdom.

The improvement of lands certainly requires the attention of a ſtate as much as the improvement of its fiſheries, or any other object; becauſe, by this, as well as by the other means, the population of a ſtate is increaſed, and a produce obtained, either for home conſumption or foreign export.

That the lands of this kingdom are improving, every lover of his country muſt ſee with pleaſure, who obſerves the numerous acts that are paſſed every ſeſſions for the diviſion of waſte lands.

One general bar to improvement is, that moſt lands are liable to pay tithe when in grain, under which crops, during the courſe of their improvement, they muſt frequently be;—and one-tenth of the produce, where much labour and manure are expended, is in ſome places a heavy rent. However this is happily avoided, when before an application for an act for diviſion a modus can be agreed on, or a certain part of the lands accepted, to exempt the remainder from all tithes.

The reader will forgive this deviation, and the extra length of the preface, when he conſiders that a writer of ſuch acknowledged political abilities as Governor Pownal, differing in ſentiment in a material point from the author of this treatiſe, rendered it highly neceſſary to refute, as far as in his power, theſe objections againſt his principles.

January 10, 1777.

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SECTION I.

INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE

On the Impropriety of reſiſting an eſtabliſhed Government without due Cauſe.

THE vindicators of the Americans, in their preſent reſiſtance againſt their Parent-State, have laid great ſtreſs on the *right of the People* to alter and remodel their Government whenever they pleaſe.

As I allow there is no *power held by divine right*, I agree with them in their aſſertion; if by the *people* be meant the majority of an empire, not that of a province only; for in the latter caſe the county of York would have a right to alter its conſtitution; ſo would Devonſhire, &c. Suppoſing this effected, the people of one Riding or Diviſion of Yorkſhire might chuſe another form of government, and, on the ſame principle, from a further diſunion and caprice we might before long have as many ſeparate and independent ſtates as pariſhes; unleſs we fell ſooner a prey to any power that choſe to take advantage of our diviſions and inteſtine broils.

A province of an empire may nevertheleſs, if labouring under particular oppreſſion, be juſtified in taking up arms in defence of their liberties, although they may have no right to

do it in trivial cauſes, nor for the avowed purpoſe of changing their form of government.

What I ſhall now endeavour to prove is, That no Governing Power, whether an Ariſtocracy, a Democracy, a limited, or even an abſolute Monarchy ought, without great occaſion, to be reſiſted; and further, That the Americans have had no ſuch cauſe to juſtify their riſing in Arms.

The end of all good government is to prevent the ſtrong from oppreſſing the weak, the lawleſs from committing depredations on the peaceful and induſtrious; and by ſecuring perſonal freedom and private property, to promote induſtry the great ſource of riches and collective ſtrength, that the community, ſo combined, may not only keep peace and good order among themſelves, but be able to repel the hoſtile invaſions of any other community, or body of people, that may endeavour to diſturb their tranquillity and repoſe.

As it is obvious the whole body of the people cannot be engaged in legiſlation and the executive part of government, it follows, that theſe powers muſt be entruſted in the hands of a certain number of the community, which will be more or leſs according to the form of their government. Now let the form of the conſtitution be ever ſo good, thoſe who actually poſſeſs the ruling power will have paſſions like other men, and conſequently be liable to err; but it does not follow, that for every error of government, which they might probably

bably correct of themſelves, the people, who think they are, or are in reality in ſome meaſure, aggrieved, ſhould riſe in arms and oppoſe them; for this would eternally be productive of bloodſhed, anarchy and diſorder, and ſo far weaken the community, that they would become an eaſy prey to the ambitious views of any neighbouring power.—They would then loſe the ſubſtance of liberty, by graſping at its ſhadow: Even ſuppoſing them ſucceſsful, all they can do is to truſt the power in the hands of other men, who, as men, either through depravity of mind or want of judgment, will be as liable to err as the former. They will then, *if they have been contending without ſufficient cauſe*, after having exhauſted much blood and treaſure, and brought ruin upon many who would otherwiſe have been in happier circumſtances, have the ſame to contend for over again, or quietly ſit down with theſe additional aggravations of miſery, which they have brought upon themſelves.

As all governing powers are liable to err and encroach on the liberty of the ſubject, ſo are they likewiſe capable of reforming when they have ſeen into the falſe policy of what they have done. This event ought to be expected with ſome degree of patience, or reſiſtance is criminal becauſe *productive of greater evils than thoſe it endeavours to redreſs.*

I by no means intend to infer that the governing powers ſhould never be reſiſted,

for, as a Briton, I glory in the noble and ſucceſsful reſiſtance our anceſtors made to the arbitrary power of Charles I. I only wiſh to point out a medium between abſolute obedience or non-reſiſtance, and riſing in arms without duly conſidering whether the cauſe, *in its ill effects to them and their poſterity*, be equal to the immediate carnage and ruin infallibly attendant on civil war.

Civil wars, even in a juſt cauſe, too frequently end where they began; for by the continuance of them the people become tired of their conſequent anarchy and diſtreſs, and contraſting their then unſettled ſtate with peace at home, and their former, though perhaps very indifferent government, are glad to have any government at all; thus it returns into its old channel; while the advantage and opportunity of remodelling the ſtate and obviating the defects of the old conſtitution, are entirely, or in a great meaſure loſt in the general deſire of quiet and repoſe, after ſuch ſcenes of turbulence and bloodſhed.—Witneſs moſt of the revolutions in this Kingdom and in almoſt every other ſtate.

Before I enter into the merits of the preſent unhappy conteſt, it will be neceſſary to conſider the connection there is between a Parent-ſtate and its Colonies, with the natural claims of the former, which when diſcuſſed the other will follow of courſe.

SECT.

SECTION II.

Motives of Colonization and comparative advantages to Great Britain, from her different Continental Colonies, in North America.

A LATE writer in a ſenſible treatiſe* on the importance of the American Colonies to Britain, obſerves very juſtly, "there "are three grand reaſons for a country's "planting colonies."

1. "Affording a national retreat to ſuch "perſons as will emigrate."

2. "Affording a retreat to the emigrants of "foreign countries."

3. "Raiſing the productions of climates dif-"ferent from their own, and thereby ſaving "the purchaſe of ſuch."

If we enquire how far our Colonies in America have anſwered theſe ends, we ſhall find ſome of them have done it in a greater degree than others.

The Northern Colonies, we know, in the time of Charles the firſt in particular, were reſorted to, and peopled by great numbers of emigrants from this kingdom, who, had it not been for our poſſeſſion of, or claim to thoſe provinces, would have been abſolutely loſt to this country, and conſequently its power diminiſhed in the proportion theſe emi-

* Latter part of 2d. vol. of American Huſbandry.

grants

grants bore to the whole number of the people; at the ſame time, that ſome other powers, perhaps our rivals, had been reaping a proportionate acceſſion of ſtrength. Thus far the firſt motive of acquiring new ſettlements has been anſwered.

The ſecond is of a ſimilar nature, as the receiving under our government, emigrants from foreign countries, not only ſtrengthens ourſelves, but weakens thoſe they have come from. This advantage we have likewiſe reaped from our American ſettlements, for beſides the Swedes and Dutch, that were left in the Colonies of New Jerſey and New York,* when thoſe powers gave up their claim to theſe Colonies, immenſe numbers of Germans and other foreigners have reſorted thither from Europe.

The third end of colonizing, viz. "raiſing "productions the mother-country cannot." It is plain it cannot be anſwered by the New England Colonies, as their climate is ſimilar to our own, unleſs they produced ſome minerals the mother-country does not, which in ſome of them is not the caſe. From their cli-

* The province of New York, called by the Dutch New Holland, or New Netherlands, was conquered from that power in the latter end of the year 1664. The Dutch recovered it in 1672, but reſtored it a few months after by the treaty of peace. At the time of this conqueſt, New Jerſey was entirely under the dominion of the Dutch, they having long ſettled the north eaſtern parts, as a part of New Holland, and a little before the period above-mentioned, bought the remainder of Rizing, the Swediſh General.

mate

TABLE of the POPULATION, IMPORTS, EXPORTS, &c. of the British-American Continental Colonies.

Provinces.	No. of Inhabitants, white and black.		British Ships employ'd	No. of Seamen	Value of Imports from Great Britain.		Value of Exports.	Different Articles exported to Great Britain, Europe, the West Indies, &c.
anada — — —	} 120,000	{	34	408	— —	105,000	105,500	Peltry, wheat, lumber, whalebone, fish oil, &c. — — N. B. Value of peltry £. 76,000
abrador — — —			—	—	— —	*	49,050	Fish oil, whalebone, and seal skins
ova Scotia and Northern Islands	— — 40,000		6	72	— —	26,500	38,000	Fish, fish oil, lumber, and whalebone — — — N. B. Produce of fisheries £. 34,000
New England: Massachusets Bay	280,000							
New Hampshire	80,000							
Connecticut	180,000	600,000	49	588	— —	407,000	485,000	Fish oil, fish, lumber, ships, pot-ash, live stock, salt provisions, &c. &c.† N. B. Produce of fisheries £. 250,000
Rhode Island	60,000							
ew York — — —	100,000		30	330	531,000		526,000	Flour and biscuit, wheat and other grain, deer skins and peltry, salt provisions, lumber, copper ore and iron in pigs and bars, live stock, flax seed, pot-ash, ships, &c. N. B. Amount of flour and provisions £. 386,000
aſt and West Jersey —	80,000	580,000				1,142,000		☞ Both the imports and exports of New Jersey are included in those of New York and Pensylvania.
ensylvania with lower Counties on Delawar	400,000		35	390	611,000		705,500	Flour, wheat and other grain, salt provisions, deer skins and peltry, lumber, copper ore and iron in pigs and bars, flax seed, live stock, ships, &c. — N. B. Amount of flour and provisions £. 517,000
irginia and Maryland —	— — 720,000		330	3,960	— —	865,000	1,040,000	Tobacco, wheat and other grain, lumber, iron in pigs and bars, ships, deer skins and peltry, hemp, salt provisions, flax seed, &c. — — N. B. Value of tobacco £. 768,000
orth Carolina — —	120,000		34	408	18,000		68,350	Tar, pitch and turpentine, lumber, tobacco, Indian corn and other grain, deer skins and peltry, live stock and rice. — — — N. B. Tar, pitch, and turpentine £. 17,850
outh Carolina — —	180,000	300,000	140	1,680	365,000	383,000	395,666	Rice, indigo, deer skins and peltry, salt provisions, live stock, Indian corn and other grain, ships, &c. N. B. Rice £. 220,000
eorgia § — — —	30,000		24	240	49,000		74,200	Rice, deer skins and peltry, live stock, drugs, silk, indigo, &c. — N. B. Value of rice £. 36,000
aſt Florida § — —	4,000	40,000	2	24	7,000	153,000	— —	‡
Vest Florida § — —	6,000		10	120	97,000		63,000	Deer skins and peltry, logwood and other dying woods, and silver in dollars.
	2,400,000		694	8,220		3,081,500	3,550,266	

N. B. The articles of export follow each other in the same succession as the value of their respective amounts, beginning with the greatest first: And where two or more articles are joined together, they nge with the others according to their collective value.

* No regular exports to Labrador, as we have no fixed settlements except in the southern parts, the exports to which are included in those to Canada. The consumption of the fishermen and traders is supplied from the place they come from ery season, viz. principally from New England. One hundred and twenty sail of American vessels are employed.

† From New London and other places in Connecticut they have lately shipt off large quantities of wheat, but principally by the way of New York, by which channel a considerable part of their other produce is exported.

‡ At the time these estimates were made, the export from East Florida, in indigo and peltry, might be about 5 or 6000l. annually. Since that period some considerable rice plantations have been set forward on St. John's and St. Mary's rivers; and ey had likewise begun to cut large quantities of lumber, viz. staves, shingles, pine scantlings, &c.

§ The number of the inhabitants in Georgia, and each of the Floridas respectively, is estimated by the author, as the aggregate was only given, in the account the above is copied from.

☞ Fur and peltry—Deer skins and peltry—may by some be deemed an impropriety, as both furs and deer skins come under the general name of peltry: They are however mentioned separately, as essentially differing in value.



mate being the ſame, it follows, that the inhabitants muſt principally apply themſelves to the ſame employments as their fellow-ſubjects in Britain, that is raiſing corn and proviſions, and exporting their ſuperfluity, in which, as well as in the fiſheries, they rival Great Britain and Ireland, and without reſtraint, as their principal products are not among the enumerated articles;* and now, as they are, in many places collected in towns, and become ſo populous, as to have hands to ſpare from agriculture, they in a great meaſure raiſe many of the manufactures they conſume: whereas, the ſupplying of them with ours, was the principal advantage we reaped from them, and the only one wherein they could be ſaid to adminiſter to the taxes paid for the ſupport of the empire.

How far they do this, will appear from the following table of the population of the Colonies, and value of Britiſh exports to each; with the exports from each Colony, and number of Britiſh ſhips and ſeamen employed.

* Sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, ginger, fuſtick, or other dying wood, rice, molaſſes, hemp, copper-ore, beaver-ſkins, or other furs, pitch, tar, turpentine, maſts, yards, and bowſprits of the growth, production, or manufacture of any of the Britiſh plantations in America, Aſia, or Africa, are articles *enumerated* by 12 Car. II. chap. 18, 22, and 23. Car. II. chap. 26, 25. Car. II. chap 7, 3 and 4 Ann, chap. 5 and 10, 12 Ann, chap. 9, &c. &c. all which articles (except rice and ſugar under certain limitations) cannot be carried from any of the ſaid places, unleſs to ſome other *Britiſh plantations*, or to the kingdom of *Great Britain*.

The

The fore part of the foregoing table, as far as relates to the population of the Provinces, is taken from an account publiſhed in New Jerſey in Nov. 1765, and that part which relates to the number of Britiſh ſhips and ſeamen employed in the commerce of each colony, and the amount, &c. of the exports and imports, is extracted from the American Traveller, publiſhed in 1769. The imports and exports are at a medium of three years, and I believe pretty accurate for that time.

As the number of inhabitants in New England were 600,000, and the Britiſh exports thither £. 407,000, it follows, that each individual took from Britain thirteen ſhillings and ſix-pence nearly.—To view this in the moſt favourable light, we will ſuppoſe thoſe articles * and manufactures were made entirely of Britiſh raw materials, and conſequently the value of them derived ſolely from the labour employed in raiſing the raw materials, and compleating from them the manufactures (including the profit of thoſe through whoſe different hands the materials, both before and after manufacturing paſs).—Now, if we rate the annual labour of a manufacturer (manufacturers, their wives and children at an ave-

* Coarſe German linens form a conſiderable part of our exports, likewiſe India goods and other articles that our manufactures have nothing to do with. Of theſe warehouſe rent, porterage, the profit of our merchants, and the ſmall difference between duty and draw-back are the advantages we reap.

rage)

rage) at £. 13 10*, it follows, that *twenty New England coloniſts*, paying 13s. 6d. each for Britiſh labour, only employ one individual; and ſuppoſing this perſon without that employ muſt otherwiſe have emigrated, they then *only pay the taxes of one Britiſh reſident*, and this, one of the lower claſs of the people. As it is therefore plain they only pay each individual, rich and poor on an average, one-twentieth part of what a labouring perſon does in Britain, towards the government, fleet, and armies, which protect *them* equally with *ourſelves*, it becomes matter of enquiry what benefit this kingdom reaps from theſe Colonies that entitles them to be ſo much more favoured than their fellow-ſubjects in the Mother-country. It naturally occurs—Are they not reſtrained in their commerce? No! they enjoy every advantage with thoſe who pay more than twenty times their taxes. Thus eaſed of burthen, they rival them in every reſpect. They carry their corn and other produce to foreign markets, where they meet the productions of Britain, and occaſion them to lay on hand by underſelling them. They likewiſe run away with the principal ſhare of that great ſource of Britiſh wealth and naval power, *the Fiſhery of Newfoundland.*

All the reaſon that can be given for this partiality is, that none would emigrate from

* Able men in moſt manufactures, earn at leaſt 10s. per week, £. 26 yearly, and children from 3s. to 7, viz. £. 7. 16. to £. 18. 4.

their native country without ſome view of advantage, and that they maintain their own civil eſtabliſhment—A burthen not ſo great as that of many corporate towns in Britain, who maintain, or give ſalaries to their Mayors, Recorders, &c.

Can it be the intereſt of Britain to ſupport Colonies that reap every eſſential advantage of commerce with herſelf, and at the ſame time exempt them from all authority or allegiance but what they pleaſe to admit? It certainly cannot, for then they would, to all intents and purpoſes, be more detrimental than if they were independent ſtates.

Holland, Hamburgh, Bremen, &c. to which places our exports are more conſiderable, even in proportion to their population, might with the ſame reaſon expect to ſhare all the advantages of Britiſh ſubjects in the Britiſh dominions, and that we ſhould pay the expence of maintaining the fleets and armies that might be found neceſſary to protect them.

Let us now advert to our other American Colonies, and we ſhall find as they advance towards the ſun, they are the more beneficial to Britain, as, from their difference in climate, they produce ſtaple commodities that this iſland cannot, and enable us, not only to ſupply our own neceſſities, by an exchange of our manufactures, but likewiſe, for the ſame exchange, afford us a ſuperfluity of thoſe ſtaples (rice and tobacco in particular) which

we

we exchange with other nations, in a great meaſure for bullion, or at leaſt for ſuch neceſſaries as we ſhould otherwiſe have to ſend ſo much bullion out of the kingdom for.

A further advantage attending theſe Southern Colonies is, that while they are employed in raiſing thoſe great ſtaples of agriculture, ſo advantageous both to us and them, they do not manufacture for themſelves, neither do they interfere with the Mother-country, in the carrying trade nor the fiſheries. The reaſon is obvious, they find agriculture more advantageous than either.

The imports to New York and Philadelphia, from Britain, are almoſt equal to 40s.* for each individual in the provinces of New York, Jerſey and Philadelphia; a greater proportion than even any of the ſouthern Colony imports, Weſt Florida excepted.

Excepting peltry, copper-ore, iron, flax-ſeed, and pot-aſh, theſe provinces do not raiſe any ſtaple of moment valuable to Britain: and as two-thirds of the value of their exports are in flour, grain, and proviſions, it muſt be admitted, they in ſome meaſure rival Great Britain and Ireland, but when we conſider the greater part of theſe return to Britain, to employ our manufacturers, and purchaſe articles we have imported, we have the leſs reaſon to complain, although it would be

* This and the following ſums in this ſection, are calulated from the data, in the table of exports and are all ſterling.

more advantageous, were their induſtry turned into another channel, or their export of proviſions properly regulated. However, as exports of grain from Britain, are not now to be expected annually, and were this kingdom and Ireland fully peopled, all the grain and proviſions raiſed, would in general be conſumed at home; the export of grain from our Colonies, unreſtrained as it now is, is not of ſo evil a conſequence to this kingdom, as the interference of theſe (and the New England) Colonies with us in the fiſheries, which will be particularly treated of in a future ſection.

Virginia and Maryland, for each inhabitant* take from Britain, about 24s. the Carolinas 25s. 6d. Georgia 32s. 8d. Eaſt Florida 35s. and Weſt Florida £. 16 . 3 . 4. The Britiſh articles ſent to the coaſt of Guinea, to purchaſe the ſlaves imported into theſe Colonies, will conſiderably increaſe thoſe ſums.

And beſides (as we have obſerved before) the great advantage we make by their ſtaples, and non-interference in the carrying trade and fiſheries, unite to make thoſe Colonies of the greateſt conſequence to Britain.

The vaſt amount of the Weſt Floridan import (£. 16 . 3 . 4) for every individual of its population, is owing to the conveniency of its ſituation for trade with the Indians for furs; and with the Spaniards, from whom, in exchange for Britiſh commodities, they receive

* The Indians are not included.

dying

dying woods, indigo and dollars, all which prove the great importance of this province and of that trade, which the adminiſtration of Grenville was ſo impolitic, as to endeavour to put a ſtop to.—The great exceſs of the Weſt Floridan imports above their exports is what muſt happen in all new ſettlements, and was occaſioned by the ſtocks of goods required to carry on the Spaniſh and Indian trades, and the capitals neceſſary to improve their lands, which they have begun to cultivate in the weſt parts of the province.

The imports and exports both of Canada and the adjoining part of Labrador (the only part that is inhabited, except by Indians) are included under thoſe of Canada. They do not, according to our data, take from Britain more than the value of 17s. 6d. for each inhabitant, conſequently this Colony has the appearance of being little profitable; but when we conſider the principal part of their export conſiſts in an advantageous ſtaple, peltry, it is not, though far north, without its uſe to this country*.

Nova-Scotia, and the iſles of Cape Breton, St. John's, &c. take but at the rate of 13s. 3d. for each individual of their inhabitants; notwithſtanding this they would be va-

* Canada, ſince that time, has encreaſed greatly in the exportation of grain, ſo that in the year 1773 they were able to export 50,000 quarters of wheat, and in 1774 or 1775, near double that quantity.

luable

luable Colonies, as near nine-tenths of their exports are the produce of the fiſheries *on their own coaſts*, were the carriage of this produce to market to be ſolely in Britiſh ſhips.

More than half the export of the New England Colonies is the produce of their fiſheries, but the reaſon why diſadvantageous to us is, this produce is that of fiſheries diſtant from them, which the Parent-ſtate might carry on to advantage. As to the fiſheries *on their own coaſt* they are the beſt ſituated to carry them on, and it would be unreaſonable, as well as impolitic, to prevent them.

It would be equally ſo, not to ſuffer them to carry on the whale or other fiſheries wherein every other power has a right to fiſh as well as ourſelves. All is, they ſhould be confined to theſe, and then, if we have the carriage of their produce to market, neither party can have juſt reaſon to complain.

SECTION III.

On the principles of policy, that ought to ſubſiſt between a parent ſtate and her Colonies, conſiſtent with the reciprocal intereſts of both.

IT cannot be ſuppoſed, that any country would colonize or ſend, protect and ſupport people in diſtant countries, for a great length of time, and at a vaſt expence, if it was expected theſe colonies would, as ſoon as opportunity offered, and they could do without the parent-country's protection, repay all her kindneſs by looking on themſelves as an *original* and independent people—Nor ſhould it be imagined, that the legiſlature of the Mother-country, ſhould have an uncontroulable, unlimited power, over the property of the coloniſts. The line certainly ſhould, and may be drawn ſo, as to be advantageous to, and anſwer what ought to be the real intereſts of both.

" The Mother-country, in recompence of " founding, ſupporting, and giving protection " to the Colonies, ſhould be intitled to carry " on ſolely in her own ſhips*, all their trade " to

* Since writing this ſection, have accidentally turned upon a part of Poſtlethwaite's Commercial Syſtem of Great Britain, wherein I find his ſentiments on Colony Navigation are ſimilar to what I have wrote; and as he is a writer of acknow-

" to and from Europe*, and even all parts " of the world, their own and adjoining " coaſts and iſlands excepted—And to re- " gulate their commerce, ſo as to make it " coincide with her own intereſts.

" The

knowledged political merit, I ſhall, for the ſatisfaction of the reader, give them in his own words, viz.

After laying down the cauſes of colonization, he ſays, " From theſe principles it follows, that Colonies are deſigned " for culture only, and that the navigation occaſioned by " that culture belongs to the ſeamen of the Mother-country.

" This maxim cannot be controverted; and it would be " better to inforce it with rigour, than ſuffer it to be too " much deviated from by over great lenity, or any other " means."

The ſame author obſerves, that " the firſt kind of naviga- " tion uſeful, and even neceſſary to colonies, is their coaſt- " ing trade." And further ſays, " Another branch of navi- " gation uſeful to them, is that which they carry on with " other Colonies, to ſupply them only with commodities of " the product of the Mother-country, or of their own growth, " not admitted by their Mother-country at home, though al- " lowed in the Colonies for prudential reaſons."

* This is nothing more than a power we have already exerciſed with our American Colonies, for by the 3 Geo. II. chap. 28, and 27 Geo. II. chap. 18, admitting rice to be carried direct from Carolina or Georgia to any part of Europe ſouth of Cape Finiſterre, it is enacted that it ſhall be only in ſhips built in Great Britain, and *belonging* to Britiſh ſubjects *reſiding in Great Britain*, and legally navigated. And by the 12 Geo. II. chap. 30, and 24 Geo. II. chap. 57, ſugars of the growth, produce, or manufacture of the plantations may there be ſhipt for any foreign part of Europe, provided it be in veſſels built in Great Britain, and *belonging to ſubjects reſiding in Great Britain*, or the *major part of them* reſiding in Great Britain, and the reſidue in ſome of the Britiſh ſugar colonies in America. Likewiſe the ſhips loading rice or ſugar, even under theſe regulations, are obliged to proceed to Great Britain before they return to the Britiſh plantations.

In

"The Colonies in return for this reſtraint "on their navigation and trade, ſhould be "exempted from all internal taxes whatever, "for the ſupport of the empire." They would therefore have nothing to maintain but their own civil power, which would be a very trivial burthen.

"And laſtly, their Legiſlation ſhould be in "every reſpect equally free and ſimilar to that "of the Mother-country, and their gover-"nors appointed from thence."

Before we enter into the particular merits and conſequences of theſe regulations, let us ſee whether the Colonies could have any juſt reaſon to complain.—Let us imagine ourſelves under the ſame predicament.

Suppoſe Britain dependent on France, and ſhe to make the following offer to us:

"You may either enjoy all the privileges "we do as French ſubjects and reſidents, pro-"vided that, equally with us, you pay all "taxes and burthens of the ſtate; or other-"wiſe you may be exempt from all internal "taxes, except the maintenance of your own "civil power, leaving to us the entire regu-

In this inſtance Dean Tucker has made a miſtake in aſſert-ing, "that all the coaſts of the Mediterranean and the ſouth "of Europe are already ſupplied with rice from the Colonies, "in the ſame manner as if there had been an actual ſepara-"tion; no rice-ſhip bound to any place ſouth of Cape Fi-"niſterre being at all obliged to touch at any part of Great "Britain." See his *True Intereſt of Great Britain in regard to the Colonies*. The laſt of his *Four Tracts on Political and Commercial Subjects*.

"lation of your trade, and to be your ſole "carriers by ſea, your coaſting trade excepted."

Britain, ſo far from loſing by the latter choice, would, in my opinion, evidently gain.

Doctor Price, in the appendix to his Obſervations on Civil Liberty, has eſtimated the whole drawn from the public in taxes and cuſtoms, with the charges of collecting them at £. 12,000,000. Of this ſum the cuſtoms of England and Scotland (with charges of collection and different bounties, which are part of their produce) are only about £. 3,100,000. Now ſuppoſing we ſet aſide a further ſum of £. 400,000, for the annual ſupport of the governor (or viceroy) and the civil power, there will ſtill remain an exemption from the payment of eight millions and a half, a ſum infinitely greater than could poſſibly be gained by all the ſhipping of the kingdom, perhaps more than the whole freight of its commerce.

From theſe premiſes it will admit of no diſpute, that were the Colonies excluded from all foreign navigation, and at the ſame time exempted from internal taxation, the coloniſts, as individuals, would enjoy greater advantages than the reſidents in Britain, even ſuppoſing their external taxes were as high as they are now in this kingdom, and they were further deprived of carrying on their coaſting trade in their own ſhips.

The Colonies ſouth of Pennſylvania have very little ſhipping, ſo can feel no inconvenience

nience from the propoſed reſtriction, as they already employ Britiſh ſhips, or thoſe of their neighbours, the northern Colonies.

The proprietors of ſhips in the northern Colonies, from the great number they poſſeſs and employ, not only in their own immediate commerce, but even in that of the Colonies to the ſouth, would be the only body of people who could have any ſhadow of reaſon to complain, were the propoſed reſtraining law put immediately in force; but by ſuſpending it for one or two years, theſe people would have time ſufficient to obviate any inconvenience thence ariſing to themſelves, by diſpoſing of their ſhipping to the reſidents of Britain (who would have a great demand for ſhips from their increaſe of carrying trade) or otherwiſe, by becoming reſidents in Britain, they might continue their property in ſhips, and the employ of them unchanged.

This alternative, mild and eaſy as it is, would undoubtedly be complained of as an infringement of natural liberty; but even ſuppoſing it a hardſhip, it is neceſſary the intereſt of individuals ſhould give way to the good of the public.

If it be eſſential that all the ſhipping employed in the Colony foreign trade ſhould be Britiſh property, it is equally, or even more ſo that they ſhould be navigated by Britiſh denizens or reſidents, that is (according to the act of navigation in other caſes) the maſter and two-thirds of the crew ſhould be Britiſh.

As ſailors are a claſs of men that will not readily betake themſelves to any other employment, it would be highly neceſſary to provide for thoſe Americans who are already of that profeſſion, and at the ſame time put a ſtop to their farther increaſe.

Both theſe ends, I am of opinion, would be anſwered, by allowing all American ſailors, and others who were actual apprentices to that employment, at the commencement of the propoſed act, to be regiſtered as ſuch (within a limited time) in any of the Colony vice-admiralty courts; and on producing certificates of the ſame, to paſs as Britiſh denizens in every reſpect, except the Newfoundland fiſhery, for reaſons hereafter mentioned. But that no American, except thoſe ſo regiſtered, ſhall be eſteemed a denizen of Britain, unleſs he ſerve an apprenticeſhip of ſeven years in a Britiſh merchant ſhip, or has been ſo long on board a man of war, and likewiſe become, as far as he can as a ſeaman, a reſident in this country, by his family, ſhould he have one, reſiding here.

The commercial advantages, beſides acceſſion of power, ariſing to this country, from the principal navigation of the Colonies being carried on in ſhips of Britiſh property, and navigated by Britiſh ſeamen, are ſo obvious, that they need not be inſiſted on. However, we ſhall enumerate a few of them.

1. The profits of the freights of the ſhips ſo employed, by coming ſolely to this country, would

would bring the general balance of trade ſo much more in our favour, and add to the public revenue by the proportion of taxes paid by the proprietors of the ſhips, ſo far as the profits contribute to their ſupport, and likewiſe increaſe our population, by the acquiſition of ſuch proprietors of ſhips from America as chuſe to continue their property in that employ.

2. The like advantages to the revenue and population will reſult from thoſe ſailors employed in the colony trade who have families, and from their families being reſident here, and deriving their ſupport from them or their wages.

To eſtimate the particular amount of the advantage to Britain from this acceſſion of ſhips and ſeamen, it would be neceſſary to know pretty nearly the number employed.

Dr. Mitchel aſſerts that the Britiſh Colonies in America maintain 45,000 ſeamen, and another writer * makes it appear that Britain herſelf employs in that trade far ſhort of 15,000†; therefore, coloniſts employed, muſt exceed 30,000; now deducting 5,000 for their own coaſting trade, there will remain 25,000 ſeamen gained to Britain, and, eſtimating one ſeaman‡ neceſſary for every 20 tons burthen of a ſhip, be 500,000 tons of ſhipping, or ac-

* American Traveller.

† Sailors in the Newfoundland trade, but not the boatmen included.

‡ In very ſmall veſſels a greater proportion of hands are required, but in large veſſels a leſs number than the average made uſe of.

cording

cording to the King's meaſurement (which bears proportion to the burthen nearly as 3 to 4) 375,000 tons—Now, ſuppoſing theſe ſhips to be only employed 8 months in the year, and at the freight of 10s. per ton meaſurement per month* it follows the whole amount will be £. 1,500,000, one-third of which, at leaſt, viz. half a million, would center in this kingdom, as profits to the ſhip-holders, and maintenance of the families of the ſailors.

It may be the opinion of many, that Britain ſhould of right reſerve to herſelf the navigation between the continental Colonies and the Weſt Indies, as well as that of Europe, &c. The principal objection to this is, the ſhipping employed in that trade would have no occaſion ever to come home, and in conſequence, the ſeamen, though Britiſh, could have no families in England, and would of courſe become Americans as they muſt form their connections there. However, to prevent the growing power of the northern Colonies, who would otherwiſe continue to be carriers by ſea for thoſe of the ſouth, it might be neceſſary to lay the trade under this reſtriction, that no ſhips, Britiſh and Weſt Indian excepted, but thoſe belonging to the reſpective Colony, ſhould be permitted to load in that Colony any cargo for the Weſt Indies, but to have no reſtraint whatever as to their place of delivery on their return.

* The freight in the tranſport ſervice at the worſt times is 9s. per ton per month, and is now up to 12s. 6d.

SEC-

SECTION IV.

The ſubject of the foregoing Section continued.

Newfoundland and Northern Fiſheries—Regulations of the Corn-trade of the Colonies, &c.

THE fiſhery of Newfoundland, we have premiſed the Colonies ſhould have no ſhare in. It is a ſource of wealth that ought to be as ſtrictly guarded as the Dutch do their ſpice trade, as it is of many times the conſequence: it is therefore to be lamented, that any European power ſhould ſhare with us any part of it, much more ſo conſiderably as our natural rivals do.

What adds greatly to the importance of Newfoundland is, that its fiſhery not only gives employment to our artificers at home, and a great number of our ſhipping to convey its produce to market, but likewiſe occupation to vaſt numbers of the poor, both in Britain and Ireland, who go out every year to carry on the fiſhery, and return when it is over to ſpend the produce of their labour with their families in their own country: thus adding to the imperial-ſtate's population and ſtrength, and affording in time of war, a reſource of men able to ſerve her at ſea.

The conſumption of fiſh and all other articles are undoubtedly limited, and when the number

number in any profeſſion are too numerous, the profits are ſo far reduced, that thoſe only who are moſt advantageouſly ſituated can carry it on; therefore, the other competitors are neceſſitated to deſiſt and ſeek employment elſewhere. The New Englanders are certainly as well, if not better ſituated than England or Ireland, to carry on this fiſhery with their own people, conſequently, their competition muſt more and more reduce the number of fiſhermen ſent out from this country, till in the end, from the impoſſibility of making wages and paying expences, we ſhould ſend out none at all. Before the reſtraining act took place, the middle provinces* had, to the decreaſe of the numbers employed by us, by degrees come to enjoy of themſelves almoſt the principal ſhare of the fiſhery—Thus it follows, that if the greateſt degree of population poſſible ſhould be maintained in the imperial-ſtate, the Colonies ſhould by no means be allowed to interfere on the banks of Newfoundland, nor indeed from the north of Cape Sable, to the entrance of Davis's Straits.

The produce of the fiſheries of Labrador, we have already ſhewn to be upwards of £. 49,000, and that it is carried on ſolely by the Americans, who employ there 120 ſail of veſſels. Now ſuppoſing theſe veſſels at 10 men each, there is employed on the coaſt of

* New England alone employed more ſhips in the fiſhery, than both Great Britain and Ireland.

Labrador

Labrador 1200 men from the middle Colonies, which ought only to be from the Britiſh Iſles. The Americans may ſay if we were excluded, you yourſelves would not fiſh there.

This aſſertion would remain to be proved. If we did not fiſh there immediately, it would be becauſe our ſhipping were otherwiſe advantageouſly employed; but the knowledge of this reſource would ſoon increaſe the number of veſſels and adventurers, and occaſion it quickly to be entered into.

The number of reſidents in Newfoundland, that remain there throughout the year, I cannot determine; but ſuppoſe it muſt be very conſiderable from the amount of our exports thither, greatly exceeding all that can be wanted for the people ſent out from Britain and Ireland. The ſhips employed by theſe countries in the trade and fiſhery are 380, carrying, one with another, 12 men; in all 4560. The fiſhery likewiſe employs 2000 boats with 8 men each, manned by the people ſent out, and by the reſidents; together 16000 boatmen.

The amount of exports thither from Britain and Ireland, in coarſe cloathing, fiſhing-tackle, beef, pork, Britiſh-ſpirits, gun-powder, ſhot, &c. is £. 273,400. And the exports from Newfoundland to the different parts of Europe, in cod-fiſh and oil, value on the ſpot, are £. 345,000.*—Thus they were as ſtated by the

* Fiſh £. 300,000, oil £. 45,000.

American Traveller. Since then they have added to their exports a conſiderable quantity of ſeal ſkins and ſome ſalmon.

It muſt be obſerved very little of the fiſh, and a part only of the oil come to England, but go moſtly to foreign markets, ſo that the greateſt part of our export is a net balance in our favour. The great importance of this, and ſtill greater of creating and giving employ to ſuch vaſt numbers of ſailors and fiſhermen, are advantages not to be equalled by any other ſettlement or branch of commerce, and cannot be too much kept to ourſelves.

Philadelphia, New York, and ſome ports of New England, ſupply the land and fiſhery with flour, biſcuits and grain, viz. peaſe, barley, &c.

The ſame Author we quoted in the beginning of the 2d ſection obſerves, that "Bri-"tain in good policy, ought to have kept "the ſupply of the Weſt Indies with grain "entirely to herſelf*, inſtead of the uncertain "corn-trade ſhe has with Europe, becauſe the "demand would be perfectly regular, and no "where elſe is to be found ſuch conſiderable "bodies of people, that depend for their daily "bread ſolely on importation."

If this obſervation be juſt for the Weſt Indies, it will be equally ſo for our ſupplying

* The freight to either Newfoundland or the Weſt Indies would not be high, becauſe moſt veſſels go to theſe places in ballaſt, and would conſequently be content with a ſmall freight out.

Newfound-

Newfoundland with grain from Britain and Ireland only.

If Great Britain and Ireland afforded a conſtant ſurplus of grain above their own conſumption, this argument would have been ſcarcely controvertible; but when we conſider that Britain and Ireland frequently import large quantities for their own conſumption, both from the Baltic and America, would it not in thoſe years be occaſioning both the Weſt Indies and Newfoundland, to come much dearer by their proviſions, by their corn having undergone two long voyages, viz. from America to England and back again to thoſe American iſlands, than if they had been allowed to have the ſame grain immediately from the place of its growth in their own neighbourhood? Being limited to this channel, they would, in theſe inſtances, receive their grain with the additional charges of double, inſtead of ſingle freight, inſurance, intereſt of money, danger of heating,* commiſſion, &c. ſo that the conſequences muſt be unavoidably felt.

It is the intereſt of every country that has rival nations in any manufacture, although it can raiſe the raw materials within itſelf, to procure them from where they can be had cheapeſt, that they may not, by endeavouring to retain the profit on a part, loſe the ſale of the whole.

* Againſt which there is no inſurance, as grain of all kinds is warranted free from average, unleſs general, or the ſhip be ſtranded.

This reaſon will have the ſame weight in the importation of grain, becauſe proviſions of all kinds, are, in ſtrict juſtice, *a raw material in every manufacture*, more eſpecially in thoſe that derive their principal value from labour. The price of labour, or hire of men, depends not only on the number that offer themſelves for hire, but likewiſe on the price of proviſions. Were labourers plentiful, it would depend entirely upon the latter, as, from this cauſe, we find in the interior parts of Ruſſia, men are to be hired at 4 or 5 copecks, or about 2d. to 2½d. per day. However, in all places, the price of labour is more or leſs affected by that of proviſions. In countries where there is full employment for all that will labour, a fall in price of proviſions, will not for ſome time affect or lower the wages, but on the contrary, ſhould proviſions riſe and keep high, we may ſoon expect a riſe in the hire of men; what elſe is the principal cauſe* of wages being ſo much higher now, than they were a century or two ſince? Where employment is more plentiful than men, this conſequent riſe will be the ſooner effected, but even in the other caſe, it muſt in the end inevitably follow, as men cannot work for leſs than will afford them a bare ſubſiſtance.

* The great increaſe throughout Europe of ſpecie, and its repreſentative paper-currency, and the debaſement of our coin, are cauſes of a proportionate advance of labour, ſince thoſe periods, but not of the exceſs it is now arrived at.

Now,

Now, as the produce of fiſheries derive their value almoſt totally from *labour*, an increaſe of this *charge* would unavoidably give our rivals the advantage over us, and occaſion our decline, therefore, the cheaper proviſions can be afforded in Newfoundland, the more advantage to the empire.

The ill conſequences attending an advance in the price of proviſions in the Weſt Indies, are ſtill more ſtriking, becauſe the labour of the Negroes depends ſolely on the price of proviſions, at leaſt with thoſe who poſſeſs the Negroes they employ. Proviſions and hire of money * are the raw materials of, and principal charges on ſugar, rum, coffee, cotton, &c. therefore the nation at whoſe ſettlements the price of proviſions and intereſt of money are the loweſt, *ceteris paribus*, will be able to carry its Weſt India trade, and thoſe dependent on it, to the higheſt pitch.

This diſſertation on the effects of the price of proviſions in Newfoundland and the Weſt-Indies, carries us foward to conſider whether the ſame policy be not neceſſary in the Parent-ſtate.

This kingdom is a commercial one, and derives great part of its ſtability and power from the export of its manufactures, and in the vend of moſt of them has to contend with a rival power, that from the lower price

* The capitals employed in Negroes, &c.

of

of labour has introduced the produce of its fabricks into markets where we formerly had almoſt the ſole vend. It is not to be diſputed that the French in a great meaſure ſupply Turkey, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the Dutch for the Spaniſh contraband trade from Curacoa, St. Euſtatia, &c. with their woollen ſtuffs, and that the demand of them ſtill increaſes to the detriment of our own, even in places, where, by the faith of treaties, it ought to be otherwiſe. What is this owing to? To no other cauſe but the cheapneſs of labour in France; not to the goodneſs of their materials * or excellence of their workmanſhip, for we exceed them in theſe.

Does it not then behove this kingdom to ſeek out ſome remedy? It certainly does, and requires no more than to enable the labourer to live cheaper that he may labour for leſs. The only means to effect this, we have before proved, is to allow a free importation of proviſions—And as free an exportation is neceſſary, except in caſes of famine, to give due encouragement to our produce at home, that we may be the leſs dependent on foreign ſupplies.

Before that excellent act of 13 Geo. III. chap. 43. for which the nation is chiefly in-

* The French, in many of their woollen ſtuffs, cannot do without a certain proportion of Engliſh or Iriſh wool; great quantities of both, notwithſtanding our laws to the contrary, and the *enhanced price* on account of the riſk, they contrive to obtain.

debted

debted to Governor Pownal, the importation and exportation were ſo uncertain and fluctuating, that generally after a large export, and ſometimes without it, the nation was left without a ſufficient ſtock of grain; the price advanced, the poor wanted bread, and riots were frequent throughout the kingdom. Theſe diſagreeable events cannot well happen again, ſince the import and export are regulated by the above act; but we ſtill can never expect to ſee bread very cheap, or labour low, becauſe whenever the price of wheat falls below 5s. 6d. per buſhel the importation * is immediately ſtopped, and when it falls a little lower, as if we were afraid labour would become too cheap in the kingdom, we immediately give a bounty of 5s. per quarter to have our wheat carried out until again

* Rye when below 3s. 6d. per buſhel, is exportable, with a bounty of 3s. per quarter. Barley when below 2s. 9d. with 2s. 6d. bounty, and oats when below 1s. 9d. with 2s. bounty per quarter, or 8 buſhels.

By the ſame act when the prices of grain, returned at the quarter ſeſſions, are at or above the following rates they may be imported, chargeable only with the payment of ſome trivial duties, for the purpoſe of determining the quantity.

Wheat is importable when at or above 6s. per buſhel. Rye when at 4s. per buſhel. Barley at 3s. and oats at 2s. per buſhel.

When the prices are below thoſe rates and above the former, Britiſh grain is not exportable, nor foreign to be imported, without it be lodged under the joint locks of the merchant and cuſtom-houſe, until ſuch time as it ſhall be exported foreign, or the prices in the county where it lies, as returned at the quarter ſeſſions, be above the rates laſt mentioned.

it advance above that price. This is perhaps carried to our rivals to afford them to feed their manufacturers cheaper than we do our own. That they may do it is plain, when we conſider that the freight from Suſſex and Hampſhire, which are corn countries, to any part of France in the channel, will be in general only from 1s. to 1s. 6d. and even in the Bay of Biſcay will not exceed 2s. 6d. per quarter, when at the ſame time the bounty on export is 5s.

How different is the conduct of our rivals! Are their manufactures in want! The importation is immediately encouraged by high bounties. So lately as April or May 1775, on a ſcarcity of grain, the French King iſſued an edict, offering to all importers, as well in foreign veſſels as French, that ſhould arrive with foreign grain in any French port from the 15th May to the 1ſt Aug. then enſuing, a premium of 18 ſols, about 3s. per quarter, for every quintal of wheat, and 12 ſols, about 2s. per quarter, for every quintal of rye. It was alſo ordered, that all ſuch ſhips ſhould be exempted at that time from the payment of the duty on freight, or any other whatſoever. This edict had its deſired effect: corn was poured into France till it became cheaper there than at the places from whence it came.

The oſtenſible intent of our bounty on export, and limitation of import in England, is to encourage our farmers to grow grain, that the

the kingdom may not be drained of ſpecie in purchaſing it from abroad; but that, on the contrary, by ſelling the productions of our land to foreign countries, we may increaſe the general balance and relative riches of the kingdom. Theſe reaſons are plauſible, but how the intent is defeated, we will hereafter ſhew. The latent, and we may ſuppoſe principal cauſe of theſe regulations, is to enable the farmers to pay the preſent high rents to the landholders, but herein they diſtreſs the kingdom without benefitting themſelves at all, as to what they conſume of our own internal produce.

From the highneſs of rents the price of proviſions have roſe, conſequently the price of labour and of our manufactures, likewiſe the wages of ſervants and price of horſes. In theſe, I preſume, the principal part of all rents or other incomes are ſpent. Beſides this, the bounty is a charge upon the nation that is in general thrown away without anſwering the oſtenſible end; that is, of diſpoſing to foreigners a greater quantity of the produce of our lands than we otherwiſe ſhould do. For inſtance, in the latter part of the ſummer of 1775, the counties of Northumberland, Durham, and York were exporting corn to foreigners with a bounty, when at the ſame time ſome of the ports on the other ſide of the iſland were importing from abroad. Thus what came in on one hand went out on the

other, and the bounty was thrown away to no purpoſe.—As the crops of grain are never equally good throughout all parts of the kingdom, this muſt frequently happen; but were there no bounty, the exporters would find it their intereſt to ſupply the dearer markets in their own kingdom as well as thoſe of other countries.

We have before ſaid it is true policy, to allow at all times the free import and export (except in caſes of famine) of all proviſions; let us now ſee the conſequence.

We ſhould, from our ſuperior ſituation to Holland, whoſe ports in winter are frequently blocked up with ice, and are at all times, from want of water, more difficult of acceſs than ours, become the granary of Europe*. From us every ſouthern nation that wanted would be ſupplied with grain, either our own produce or that of other countries, which would increaſe the number of our ſeamen and of labourers in our ports, for the loading and unloading of ſhips.

The

* I have heard ſome men of ſenſe aſſert, that from the act of 13 Geo. III. commonly called Pownal's act, the kingdom has the ſame opportunity of becoming the granary of Europe, as if the imports and exports were unlimited. To point out the error of this opinion, we need only obſerve, "that trade will never ſeek thoſe channels where there are "many reſtraints, but ever flow where it is the leaſt in-"terrupted."

What principally occaſions Holland to be the European ſtore-houſe, is not only the freedom of import and export, but

The price of proviſions would fall, labour and our manufactures would become cheaper, and the demand for them would encreaſe, which would encreaſe the number of manufacturers. Thus the neceſſaries of life being low, and employment ſufficient for all that would labour, *this would become the country for people to emigrate to*; and the nation would encreaſe in population, riches, revenue, naval power and internal ſtrength.—What events are more to be deſired?

Our farmers would ſtill have encouragement to cultivate their lands; for labour being cheaper, they could afford their products for leſs, and beſides, would always get much more for them than the farmers of the countries we imported from, becauſe upon the produce of thoſe foreigners all the following charges muſt fall before it could be ſold here, viz. commiſſion abroad, charges on ſhipping, freight, inſurance, riſk of heating

but the chance of ſelling the articles for their own conſumption. Now, although by the above act we can freely export the grain we have imported, we cannot, if the port was not open at the time of its entry, make uſe of it at home until the price riſes ſo high, as to admit the import: and what is ſtill worſe, it cannot, while the port where it is landed remains ſhut, be exported to the other parts in the kingdom, that are *in want of*, and *open for grain from abroad*. Thus the merchant that has imported is loſing the intereſt of his money, and rent of ware-houſes, and has every reaſon to wiſh his corn was ſtill laying in the country it came from, becauſe, though not from his own granaries where it lays at hand, it would then be admiſſable in places where it might be ſold—very frequently to the next port.

and other damage, charges of landing, intereſt of money and commiſſion at home, beſides ware-houſe rent at one end or the other, and ſometimes at both.

The cheapneſs of labour, and theſe circumſtances conſidered, what have our farmers or even landholders to fear. From the greater population there would be a home conſumption for every article they could raiſe. A further effect of the encreaſe of population will be, the preſent towns muſt encreaſe, and perhaps new ones ariſe, both of which would evidently tend to the advantage of the landed intereſt, as it is well known all lands in the vicinity of towns bear exceſſive rents, becauſe convenient and neceſſary for the various purpoſes of the inhabitants.

The government would likewiſe find the advantage of all theſe conſequences, not only from the revenue being increaſed, but from the ſame amount of revenue going further, in proportion to the cheapneſs of every thing, than it now does. Thoſe who enjoy places or penſions under government would be benefitted as much as if their incomes were now raiſed in the ſame proportion, that the labour and the conveniences and neceſſaries of life would then fall.

This may appear a digreſſion, but has naturally aroſe out of the ſubject we were upon, —the regulating the commerce of the middle Colonies, (whoſe principal produce is grain) ſo as to be beneficial to the Mother-country.

We

We have endeavoured to prove how neceſſary it is for us, as a commercial nation, *and by commerce only the greateſt power is attainable*, to have the price of proviſions low, and that at the ſame time it is our intereſt that the countries who rival us (in manufactures) ſhall not have them cheaper.

We have now only to conſider how far the corn trade of America can be made conducive to theſe ends.

It cannot be, if we ſuffer them to export directly to Europe without any reſtriction, for then they would rival us in the trade we have been laying the baſis of. Their unlimited trade with proviſions to our Weſt India iſlands and Newfoundland (from which we have no occaſion to exclude ourſelves) would afford them an ample market whenever they could ſell on as good terms or better than we, which from their ſituation and other circumſtances they might always do, unleſs on ſome general failure of their crop. Then if we admit their grain to free import in Britain and Ireland to be either uſed or re-exported, as circumſtances chance to determine, they would have every neceſſary indulgence, and we ſhould reap the advantages before enumerated attendant on being the European granary. Now, as the whole of our Colony trade to Europe (as before premiſed) would be in Britiſh ſhips, it might not be unadviſeable to allow them to export direct to Europe, on the payment of

a duty

a duty on export, equivalent to the advantages we ſhould otherwiſe reap; ſuppoſe of 6d. per buſhel, or 4s. ſterling per quarter on wheat, and the ſame on flour, (allowing 4cwt. to the quarter, as in England, for the bounty.)

The common freight of grain from America to any port of Europe without the Streights is 8s. per quarter, and if up the Mediterranean 10s. Therefore as the freight to England is as low as to any part of Europe, it follows, that if the Americans chuſe to ſhip their grain direct to the place of its conſumption, the foreign conſumers would come by it 6d. per buſhel dearer than we could have it at home, which we have before proved is neceſſary to prevent ſucceſsful rivalſhip of our manufactures. The ſame reaſons will induce us not to ſuffer the exportation from America to the foreign Weſt India iſlands without a like charge of 4s. per quarter on wheat and flour, and proportionate on other grain. This we may do without danger, becauſe they cannot even then be ſupplied ſo cheap from elſewhere.

That wheat is an article that will bear a duty of 4s. per quarter on export to Europe has been already proved by the Congreſs, who laid on a much heavier one; *no leſs than* 40 *per cent. ad valorem**, on permitting ſome of

* The author received this information in a letter from his friend in Liſbon.

the

the laſt cargoes to ſail that came from Philadelphia before the blocking up of the ports. Now valuing this wheat ſo low as 25s. 40 per cent. amounts to 10s. per quarter: *Rather too heavy a charge,* but what it really bore at that time.

The ſaving of the duty of 4s. per quarter would, in my opinion, generally induce the American grain to come by the way of Britain, becauſe of the chance of finding a market, and that if it did not, the charges of unloading, ſhipping, and ſending to any port this ſide the Streights' mouth, would not exceed 4s. per quarter, and if they went further they would only incur the ſame additional advance of freight they would had they gone direct from America.

But ſuppoſing the grain in general ſhipped from America, direct for the port of conſumption, they could never rival us to our detriment, becauſe our merchants might always ſend their corn, whether Britiſh produce or imported, to any port this ſide the Streights' mouth, for 4s. per quarter or leſs. Thus our landholders would have, in all the European markets, at leaſt the whole freight from America, 8s. per quarter, advantage over theſe in the colonies, which they in return are compenſated for by the ſupply of Newfoundland, and our Weſt India iſlands, and THEIR EXEMPTION FROM INTERNAL TAXATION, *which muſt ever be had in view.*

Beſides

Beſides this duty, although laid on for the regulation of commerce, would raiſe a conſiderable revenue for the uſe of the empire, and have, as the American grain is the principal rival of ours in the ſouthern markets, the ſame effect, as a bounty of the like amount, on Britiſh grain would otherwiſe have, which, on the contrary, would diminiſh the revenue.

This ſyſtem it appears, will prevent all the ill effects we might otherwiſe feel from the rivalſhip of our northern Colonies, and inſtead of being detrimental, will render them, as much as poſſible, beneficial to the Parent-ſtate: and as to the general free import and export of grain, we may deduce, that it would be productive of the moſt happy conſequences to this kingdom, all which, it will be unneceſſary to recapitulate. As for the fears of the landholders, we have ſhewn they have no real foundation, becauſe of the many charges on grain, before it can be imported; therefore, foreign corn can never be uſed, even in the ſea ports of this kingdom, till our own be dearer by the amount of all thoſe charges. Beſides, as long as there are monied men in Europe, who are ready to ſpeculate where there may be any advantage, the price of grain can never, even in the moſt plentiful years, fall any thing conſiderably below the general average of prices: and further, the landed intereſt ſo far from having any thing

to

to fear, have every thing to expect, becauſe from the produce of the taxes going further, and the field of taxation, by the increaſe of ſubjects, being enlarged, the revenue without being leſſened, would fall lighter on individuals, and at the ſame time, afford the means of diminiſhing and paying off the debt of the nation, the intereſt* alone of which, is almoſt equal to all our other national expences, on a peace eſtabliſhment, and conſequently, the cauſe of our taxes being now double what they otherwiſe might be.

* £. 4,464,071, in 1775. Doctor Price's Appendix to obſervations on civil liberty.

SECTION V.

On the probable cauſes of the inſurrection in America, and the ſubject of the third ſection further conſidered.

WE have before premiſed *the Parent-ſtate ſhould have the regulation of the commerce of its Colonies.* This is allowed by all nations, and is ſo obviouſly neceſſary a return for founding and protecting Colonies, that the chiefs of the New England faction dared never abſolutely deny, or attempt to controvert it.

Now what is the regulation of commerce, but the admitting or prohibiting the exportation or importation of any article to or from any particular country?

This being allowed, it certainly follows that the power which can admit or prohibit, can, if it find neceſſary, prohibit only in part, or under certain reſtrictions, that is, liable to certain duties; from which the deduction is plain *that the Parent-ſtate has a right to impoſe port duties.* This right the Colonies in general ſince their ſettlement until the 7th Geo. III. chap. 46, laying a duty on paper, glaſs, painters colours, and teas never thought of oppoſing, although ſo far back as the 25th of Charles II.* an act was paſſed laying duties on

* Chap. 7. The ſame duties were continued by 7 and 8 W. and M. chap. 22, and 1 Geo. I. chap. 12.

the

the export of ſugars, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, ginger, logwood, fuſtic, and all other dying woods, and cocoa nuts, ſhipt in any of the plantations to be carried to any other of them. In the 6th of George II.* a duty was laid on all foreign rum, or ſpirits, molaſſes, ſyrups, ſugars and panneles imported into the plantations.

Beſides theſe, the former of which, notwithſtanding its preamble, could anſwer no other end but the raiſing a revenue, ſeveral ſimilar acts were paſſed at different times previous to the year 1763; the ſame ſituation they were in at which period the Americans gave out they deſired only to be placed.—If they really meant as they ſaid, they allowed the Britiſh legiſlature an undoubted right to impoſe external taxes for all purpoſes whatever.

On putting in force the act for collecting a duty on paper, &c. imported into our Colonies, the Americans, as juſt now obſerved, began to cavil about the right of this country to do ſo. The author of the Farmer's Letters, though one of the moſt ſtrenuous American advocates in this cauſe, admits, in its full extent, the right of Britain to grant port duties, when laid on for the regulation of commerce; but contends, that, when impoſed for the purpoſe of raiſing a revenue, as the preamble to the forementioned act ſets forth,

* Chap. 13. The duties continued by 29 Geo. II. chap. 26, and 1 Geo. III. chap. 9.

that then it is a ſtretch of power and ſubverſive of the liberties of the Colonies. His principal arguments reſt on the ill uſe Great Britain might make of this power while ſhe reſtrains the Americans in their manufactures.

But ſhould Britain give up the right of the latter (which ſhe has only exerciſed in ſome particular points*) which this author allows her to poſſeſs, or if ſhe diſclaim all right to the retention of exciſe, if any, and the payment of duty on the import of manufactures reſtrained, his arguments will fall to the ground.

The people of New England in particular, and the other Northern Colonies, notwithſtanding their enjoying greater liberty and exemption from taxes than any other civilized people on the face of the earth, have long been impatient of controul, and independency has been their favourite theme, as many who have reſided there can witneſs.

The Swediſh Profeſſor Kalm, who travelled through theſe provinces on botanical reſearches in the years 1748 and 1749, obſerves, that "the inhabitants of the Engliſh Colonies were "growing leſs tender to their Mother-country," and after advancing their reſtrictions in commerce, and the great acceſſion of foreigners, who generally have no particular attachment to Old England, as reaſons for their coolneſs,

* In preventing the erection of ſlitting and rolling mills for iron, mills for the manufacturing of ſteel, &c. &c.

he

he mentions this further one: "That many "people can never be contented, but ſuffer "their exceſs of liberty and their luxury often "to lead them into licentiouſneſs." He further ſays, "they informed him the Engliſh "North-American Colonies would, in the "ſpace of 30 or 50 years, be able to form a "ſtate of themſelves independant of Old Eng-"land."—How far they are able time muſt determine: their readineſs to make the attempt they have already ſhewn.

That Independency has been from the very beginning of the preſent diſpute the deſign of the American leaders, there is great reaſon to believe, notwithſtanding they made the tax on tea their oſtenſible cauſe; for at that time the body of the Americans, conſcious of the eaſy government under which they lived, were not ready to receive that doctrine, which their leaders ſince, by ſticking at no means, though ever ſo falſe, to inflame their paſſions, have gradually prepared them for. That to anſwer their purpoſe they were not aſhamed of aſſerting untruths, is ſufficiently obvious from their giving out to the multitude, that the tax on tea was an innovation and infringement of their liberties, and that the Britiſh Parliament never taxed them before; although they could not but know ſome, at leaſt, of the precedents juſt now quoted.

There was however a ſecond cauſe that much promoted the preſent troubles (for the infor-

information of which I am obliged to a gentleman, who reſided ſome time in Boſton) which was, that Mr H——k and ſome other leaders of the faction were largely concerned in ſmuggling cargoes of tea from Holland, &c. which trade, ſo beneficial to themſelves, the regulation on tea put a ſtop to, as the contraband trader had then, ſuppoſing his cargo bought as cheap as in England, and ſucceſsfully landed, only three-pence advantage over the fair dealer, inſtead of one ſhilling as formerly.—Such was the difference (in favour of America) occaſioned by drawing back on exportation the whole Engliſh duty, and laying on a duty in America of only three-pence per pound, in the place of retaining in England one ſhilling on the drawback, which was the caſe before when exported to America. This advantage to the Americans was ſo much loſs to the contraband dealers, in proportion to the trade they carried on, and which trade they ſaw, notwithſtanding they ſtill in general, becauſe the duty was not repealed, perſiſted in their agreement for the non-import of this article, would in all probability be annihilated, ſhould the Eaſt India Company,* in conſequence of the act paſſed for that purpoſe, be permitted to ſell their tea in America. This determined them to prevent it, which they did in Boſton effectually, by influencing a

* Their mode of ſale was to have been the ſame as in London, in lots by auction.

mob,

mob, or people of ſuperior condition, to diſguiſe themſelves as Indians, go on board the ſhips, and throw the tea of the Eaſt India Company into the ſea.

The loſs of this contraband trade being likely to produce a ſenſible diminution of profit to the before-mentioned perſons, joined with their love of independency, has been the unhappy means of deluging their country with blood, and reducing innumerable families from affluence to diſtreſs. If the laying on of this duty in America, or making it payable there, was an infringement of their natural rights, certainly the retaining part of the drawback was equally ſo, as the law permitted them to import none but what they bought of us. This grievance, which was one if the other be, they never complained of, and as we are neceſſitated to have cuſtom-houſe officers in America to collect the duties impoſed for the regulation of commerce, on articles that come direct from the place of their produce, as well as for other purpoſes, what difference could it make to America whether the duty was collected by the officers there, or retained in England? In the latter caſe they would have to pay ſo much the more for the article which would drain their country of ſpecie equally the ſame, as if the duties were collected there and remitted to Britain (if the taxes were ſuperior to the expences of government there, which they are not). And in

either

either caſe, the duty, whether retained or collected, is equally for the purpoſe of raiſing a revenue, as it could not be for the regulation of trade, the import being admitted from no where elſe, therefore the retaining of drawbacks or part of them is equally ſubverſive of American liberty, as the impoſition of ſimilar duties there. As they did not oppoſe the retaining of the duty in England, though confined to take theſe articles from thence, if they took them at all, it plainly follows, that the duties being made payable in America could be to them no object of diſpute. They had it equally in their option to refrain from importing the tea, and paying the tax, as they had before from buying it charged with the Engliſh duty. And if, in the former caſe, Engliſh reſidents ſent it to them contrary to their inclinations, thoſe who ſent it paid the tax, though collected in America. The Americans could not be ſaid to pay it until they purchaſed the article on which it was laid, and this was as much in their power to refuſe as before.

Let us now enquire into the objections againſt a Parent-ſtate poſſeſſing the power of laying port-duties on its Colonies (towards the maintenance of its own fleets and armies, &c. for their mutual protection) and whether, by an abuſe of this power, ſhe can hurt the intereſt of her Colonies without equally affecting her own.

The

The principal objections I have heard urged, are:

Thoſe who lay on the tax do not feel it; and as the produce is to be applied in aid, or to the diminution of their own taxes, will be induced to lay it too heavy; and that being improper judges, from not reſiding in the country taxed, will be liable to lay impoſts on improper articles.

Admitting theſe to be true, what are the conſequences?

1. It is well known the American Continental Colonies can, and do raiſe more proviſions than they can conſume; therefore the legiſlative power by taxing, or even abſolutely prohibiting the import of theſe firſt neceſſaries of life, cannot, as the Carthaginians ſometimes did with their dependent province of Sardinia, ſtarve, or in any wiſe affect the people.

Should it be ſaid they (the legiſlative authority) have it in their power to ſtarve the Weſt India Iſlands:—Doubtleſs; but can it be ſuppoſed they would be ſo devoid of reaſon, as to tax there the neceſſaries of life on importation, when the conſequence would be depopulating our moſt beneficial Colonies, or raiſing the price of their ſtaple commodities ſo much, on the part we conſume ourſelves, and perhaps rendering them too dear for re-exportation to foreign markets, by which we ſhould bring ruin on the planters, a conſequent de-

cay of trade to our own manufactures, and want of employ to our ſhipping?

2. Suppoſe an exorbitant tax on tea, and the luxuries of life.—Theſe being rendered dear can produce no ill effect, nor can, as not being eſſentially neceſſary, be any detriment to the health or real happineſs of thoſe who would conſume them; and beſides, could produce no advantage to the taxers, becauſe, by greatly leſſening the conſumption, the revenue would be leſſened, though the tax be raiſed, and ſuch great inducement given to ſmuggling, that of the leſſened conſumption but a ſmall part would be legally imported; for whenever the probability of gain is greater than the riſque of loſs (which is always the caſe in articles of conſiderable ſpecific value, when the duty is higher than the firſt coſt) no conſideration will hinder ſome men from purſuing what appears to be their intereſt. And though many of theſe men would not defraud individuals, they think it not criminal to defraud government, which ſhould repreſent the whole body of individuals in the ſtate, becauſe ſay they, and perhaps with ſome degree of juſtice, the revenues it does receive are not all applied in the manner they ought to be; therefore why ſhould not we come in for a ſhare of the ſpoils?

3. Should a nation lay a duty on the Colony import of its manufactures—the Coloniſts have their remedy by manufacturing for themſelves

ſelves: therefore, this the ſtate will never do unleſs it be on an article that can be had from, or produced no where elſe: then the ſtate has a right, if the other chuſe to buy, to ſell at its own price, that is, charged with ſuch duties as they pleaſe. But even this remedies itſelf; for the Coloniſts have it in their option not to buy, and this they certainly will do very ſparingly if raiſed too high by taxes: therefore the taxing power will find the diſadvantage two-fold: in the firſt place, by leſſening the produce of the tax; and in the ſecond, by loſing the employ of their manufacturers, and conſequently the taxes paid by them on the conſumption of their wages; likewiſe by a continuance of ſuch policy, a proportionate emigration from the want of ſuch employ.

Lord Chatham, and at the ſame time a favourite with the Americans, was of opinion, they ſhould be reſtrained from manufacturing even for themſelves, and went ſo far as to aſſert, that the very nail of a horſe-ſhoe ſhould not be made in America. Now to reſtrain them in manufacturing, and to retain the power of taxing the import of what they could manufacture themſelves, is to compel them to take goods at our own price, and leaves them without remedy; therefore it is incompatible with liberty, and improper, that we ſhould hold the power of both abſolutely reſtraining their manufactures, and laying port-

duties: conſequently if the Parent-ſtate retain the latter power, ſhe ſhould part with the former, as oppreſſive to the Colonies, or at leaſt (as before obſerved) ſo far as relates to the manufactures reſtrained, which is what ſhe has hitherto uniformly done.

We have now conſidered the effects of duties on imports.—It remains to be diſcuſſed, how far the Colonies can be injured by the duties on exports.

The right of prohibition, as before-mentioned, has never been denied a Parent-ſtate, but it is expected, ſhe only exerciſe this right in circumſtances that would interfere with herſelf. Now, the export of articles or produce, ſhe herſelf raiſes, are evidently among thoſe that interfere with her, and which, ſhe ought to enjoy ſolely on account of her great internal taxes, and the burthen ſhe bears of maintaining a naval and military power, to protect the whole empire.

However, theſe articles ſhe may either totally prohibit, or permit the export of with ſuch reſtrictions, as not much to affect herſelf: and as her different Colonies lie in different climates, it is neceſſary ſhe look on them as ſeparate ſtates, and limit their commercial intercourſe with each other, otherwiſe thoſe in a ſimilar climate with herſelf, would reap all the advantage ſhe ſhould do in ſupplying them with her produce and manufac-

tures,

tures*; whereas, each Colony manufacturing for its own conſumption, is as much as is conſiſtent with real liberty to itſelf, and ſound policy in the Parent-ſtate.

As to other articles, ſhould the Mother-country clog their export with heavy duties, ſhe conſults not her own intereſt, and it will fall more heavily upon herſelf, than on the country taxed—For if ſhe conſumes the articles, it is plain ſhe pays the taxes, as they fall ultimately on the conſumer; and ſhould ſhe render them too dear for foreign markets, ſhe likewiſe feels the ill effects, becauſe, from having the ſole carrying trade, ſhe loſes the freight of thoſe articles; and beſides, as the colony imports, which go entirely through her hands, can only at the moſt be equal to their exports, it is plain ſhe deprives herſelf, either of ſupplying them with articles of her own to ſo great an amount as ſhe might have done, or otherwiſe, of the freight of foreign

* In ſome inſtances, our legiſlature has guarded againſt the Colonies rivaling the Mother-country, in the export of manufactures, or in ſupplying one Colony with the manufacture of another, as by 10 and 11 William III. chap 10, it is enacted, that no woollen manufactures of the product of the Britiſh plantations in America, ſhall there be laden on board any ſhip, or upon any horſe, with intent to be exported, upon forfeiture of ſhip, goods, &c. and £. 500: and by the 5 George II. chap. 22, no hats or felts are to be ſhipt on board any veſſel, or loaded on any horſe, cart, or other carriage, in order to be conveyed out of *any of the Britiſh Plantations, to any other* of the Britiſh Plantations, or to any other place whatſoever, upon forfeiture of the hats and felts and £. 500.

com-

commodities, with the port duties ſhe might find prudent to lay upon them.

From all the foregoing premiſes it is apparent, that in ſuch a ſyſtem as "that of "retaining the power of laying port duties "*only*, and carrying on ſolely the active ſea "commerce (at the ſame time giving up the "reſtraint on colony manufacture, or at leaſt "the right of reſerving any part of the ex-"ciſe at home, or laying any duty whatſoever "on the import of thoſe articles ſo reſtrained)" the Parent-ſtate could never oppreſs the Colonies without affecting herſelf more deeply; and what greater tye or ſecurity can there be for her not doing it? It is the ſame ſecurity the non-electors (or non-voters) in Britain have, and greater cannot be had by any means whatever.

Colonies ſettled on an extenſive continent, and perpetually increaſing in people, till at laſt they become many times as populous as the Parent-ſtate, muſt, in the courſe of human events, ſome time or other become independent; but according to the propoſed ſyſtem, one may preſume it would be at a very diſtant period, and then only owing to ſome great revolution in the Parent-ſtate; for when exempt from all the burthen of internal taxation, except maintaining their own ſubordinate, executive, and civil power, and unreſtrained in manufacturing for their own uſe (or where reſtrained, free from all home exciſe and duties

of

of import) what temptation could Colonies have to wiſh for independence, becauſe if effected, the conſequent neceſſary eſtabliſhment of naval and military power would require an increaſe of taxes, and far heavier burthens than they before endured.

Likewiſe as commercial Colonies (for though not enjoying the property of ſhips, they would ſtill have merchants) they would, from the want of a navy, and the Parent-ſtate being ſo very powerful at ſea, be a long time prevented; for the Mother-country, from carrying on both their ſea commerce and her own, would, at ſuch period as they were ripe for revolt, not only be able to block up all their ports, but from her immenſely numerous navy prevent the interference of any other power.

Their mode of government would likewiſe long prevent an aim at independency, and at the ſame time leave the people the full enjoyment of liberty; that is, the Houſe of Repreſentatives to be elected by them, and the other two eſtates, the Council and Governor, to be appointed during pleaſure from the central power, as was the caſe, before theſe diſturbances, in all the royal governments.

Governor Barnard, in the 86th propoſition in his Principles of Law and Polity, obſerves, "there is no government in America at pre-
"ſent, where the powers are properly balanced,
"there not being in any of them a real and
"diſtinct

" diſtinct third legiſlative power mediating be-
" tween the King and the People, which is
" the preſent excellence of the Britiſh conſti-
" tution."

The obſervation is undoubtedly very juſt, as the Council, which is the middle power, are either appointed by the crown, during pleaſure, and conſequently as dependent upon it as the governor, or in other Colonies choſen by the people, or the lower-houſe, and then become ſo much addition to the popular ſcale, therefore, no mediating power in either caſe.

A remedy to this inconvenience, the Governor points out in his 88th and 89th propoſitions, viz.

" 88. Although America is not now (and
" probably will not be for many years to come)
" ripe enough for an hereditary nobility; yet
" it is now capable of a nobility for life."

" 89. A nobility appointed by the King
" for life, and made independent, would pro-
" bably give ſtrength and ſtability to the Ame-
" rican governments as effectually, as an here-
" ditary nobility does to that of Great Britain."

An appointment from the imperial ſtate, or even from the crown, of the middle power, or the council (or whatever name it may be called by) would certainly be productive of good conſequences, and prevent in a great meaſure this mediating power from being dependent on either the King or the people; but an hereditary nobility, which Governor Barnard,

nard, in his 88th propoſition, ſeems to think may be adviſeable in ſome future period, can, in my opinion, never be ſo.

It appears nearly * as dangerous to admit or eſtabliſh an hereditary ariſtocratic power in America, as it is to have the council elected by the lower houſe, for it would in the ſame manner weaken the influence of the Parent-ſtate, and occaſion them much ſooner to diſpute her negative in her laws, which, as well as the power of regulating commerce and laying port duties, ſhould be inveſted in the three eſtates † of King, Lords, and Commons.

Internal taxation, by a diſtant power, differs widely from external; becauſe there is in the former no mode of avoiding being oppreſſed by the taxes, ſhould they be exorbitant, but by the laſt reſource of arms, and this always uncertain in the event; and becauſe the aſſeſſors, by laying taxes or exciſes on manufactures, may, in ſome meaſure, force the ſale of their own, though likewiſe charged with a duty, but leſs heavy; hence it follows, that by internal taxation they may extort great ſums from the colonies or dependent

* Not quite, becauſe the nobles deriving their titles from the crown, would in ſome degree be attached to it, and more liable to be brought over to its intereſt, or that of the imperial ſtate, by motives either honorary or pecuniary, than men only elected to hold their places for a ſhort time.

† At preſent it lays in the breaſt of the king and council.

ſtates ſo taxed, without any inconvenience reſulting to themſelves.

Therefore the taxed could never reſt aſſured that their burthens would not be further increaſed. The contrary we have ſhewn to be the caſe in external taxation, becauſe the taxed could never be oppreſſed without greater inconveniencies redounding to the taxers.

There can be little doubt, that ſince the repeal of the Stamp Act, government never intended to impoſe any internal tax on the Americans, notwithſtanding by the Declaratory Act they aſſerted they had a right to tax them in all caſes whatever. However it is much to be lamented, that our legiſlature did not reſcind that declaration.—And that government, in their offers of accommodation to the Americans, did not aſſure them they would give up all right to internal taxation, and even external, on articles of manufacture wherein they were reſtrained, as theſe, though unexerciſed, (and not the port-duties, as has been pointed out) could ever be matters of real grievance, therefore as a lover of juſtice and the rights of human nature, as far as can be enjoyed in civil compact, I ſincerely wiſh that government, in their offers of reconciliation, would be explicit in theſe points, and that even ſhould America, by continuing refractory, be conquered, as there is the greateſt probability of, that they would then impoſe no other terms than ſuch as they ſhould now offer, for by theſe means they will win

win and retain the affections and allegiance of the Colonies, the object of their mutual intereſt, even long after they become ſufficiently powerful to aſſert and maintain their own independence.

One thing we have left unnoticed, which is, that no colony legiſlature ſhould poſſeſs the power of levying, for their own purpoſes, duties of import or export, or laying any local duties of exit or tranſit on goods in the interior parts of the continent, nor the raiſing any exciſe (for their own conſumption excepted) on exportable commodities, as by theſe means they might defeat every advantage to be derived to the imperial ſtate from the regulation of the port-duties.

SECTION VI.

On the propriety of reſiſtance to port-duties, and the advantages America receives from her dependence on this country.

FROM all the concluſions that have been heretofore drawn, it appears the demands of the Mother-country have been juſt, and therefore, the preſent reſiſtance of the Americans, has originated from a turbulent and ſeditious ſpirit, impatient of all controul, unmindful of the moſt ſacred ties, allegiance to and gratitude for protection and defence againſt their enemies, and their peculiar felicity of bearing a trivial part of all thoſe burthens and expences that fall with redoubled weight on their fellow ſubjects in Britain.*

It is too obvious that from the very beginning, the Boſtonians intended to break with the Mother-country at all events. All Europe knows the deſtroying the tea was not the ſudden outrage of a mob, but the long premeditated act of ſome of the principal men of the province—Had they not wiſhed the pre-

* The ſums that were raiſed in the Colonies of New England, &c. towards the proſecuting with vigour the late war, and were afterwards refunded by our parliament, have frequently been quoted as inſtances of loyalty and generoſity in the Colonies, but to me appear nothing more than what they owed to ſelf-defence, and afford a ſtriking inſtance of the liberality of this nation, in refunding thoſe ſums.

ſent event, would they not, conſiſtent with the principles of juſtice and honour, have offered reſtitution from the province, to the proprietors of the effects deſtroyed?*

They certainly uſed every endeavour to promote what they have effectuated—to inflame the minds of the people by an aggravation of ſuppoſed injuries and imaginary evils to riſe againſt government, which, in a good cauſe would be a juſt inſurrection; but in an unjuſt one can be termed nothing but rebellion.

It is a melancholy reflection, which experience has proved to be too true, that thoſe who cry out the moſt for liberty, are ſeldom genuine lovers of it: all they aim at is, to debaſe their ſuperiors to their own level or beneath it, not to advance thoſe whom fortune has placed below them, to the ſame rank with themſelves: for when poſſeſſed of power, we generally find them the greateſt tyrants—Liberty with them, conſiſts in freely exerciſing their own will, whether or no it counteract the wills, and in conſequence reſtrain the liberties of others—What more is the wiſh of a deſpot? Theſe American contenders for freedom, ſo far from being animated by a general love of liberty any further than concerns themſelves, never thing of emancipating their poor ſlaves, but look upon them as little

* The friends of their party ſay, the agent of the province had orders to offer reſtitution; but that the offer was made does not appear.

better

better than beaſts of the field, or domeſtic animals, though men as well as they, poſſeſſed of the ſame feelings, and only differing from them in colour—They behold their miſeries with the moſt unfeeling apathy, and regret not their misfortunes or death, any further than the loſs of ſo much property as their future labour might have been worth.

In their criminal laws, or the execution of them, it is notorious, the wretch who deſtroys a negro, either by a ſeries of cruelty or immediate murder, ſhall eſcape the puniſhment due to his crime; but ſhould one of thoſe unfortunate creatures be guilty of the ſmalleſt offence, ſevere juſtice will not be delayed.

A very humane writer, in a treatiſe on ſlavery, and the expediency of its abolition, publiſhed in Burlington, New Jerſey, in the year 1773, ſenſible of liberty in his countrymen being of that partial nature juſt explained, thus addreſſes them:

"Let us reconcile our practice to our a-
"vowed principles. Let not our profeſſions
"of an inviolable attachment to liberty, of
"late ſo frequently echoed from one end of
"the continent to the other, be contradicted
"by a practice as unjuſt as it is impolitic—that
"of keeping our fellow-creatures in a ſtate
"of *perpetual ſlavery.*"

The New England Colonies were ſettled principally by thoſe who fled from religious perſe-

perſecution, and they with great reaſon preached up religious liberty; but ſoon as they acquired power, what was the conſequence? Behold! they turned perſecutors themſelves, and deſtroyed without mercy thoſe who preached different tenets, though profeſſing equally with them chriſtianity. The ſame intolerant ſpirit inimical to liberty ſtill prevails with them.

At the very time they deſtroyed the tea and were declaiming againſt government for taxing an external product, that they might either uſe or not, which they termed taking their money without their conſent, they had no leſs than 18 Anabaptiſt and 2 Quaker preachers impriſoned in Boſton*, for not giving their conſent to part with their money contrary to the charter of the province; becauſe they would not pay tithes to the preſbyterian miniſtry, who had aſſumed to themſelves the right of exacting them from thoſe of other perſuaſions, although neither they, in preference, or any other ſect were authorized by charter to demand them. Theſe are the men who preach up univerſal liberty, but have their actions correſponded!

The author of the pamphlet entituled Common Senſe, ſays, "the Engliſh Americans "have never reaped any advantage from their

* This article is given on the authority of a Penſylvanian gentleman of veracity, who left that country on the breaking out of the preſent troubles.

con-

"connection with Britain, and that it would "have been happy for them, if they had "never had any thing to do with her." Was ever a more palpable falſehood aſſerted, and this for the purpoſe of miſleading a people? If England had not made good her claim to the provinces of New York and Jerſey, would not the Dutch and Swedes have been in poſſeſſion of them? Are they greater friends to liberty than the Engliſh? And would not the French and Spaniards from Canada, and the Floridas, if England had not interfered, have ſoon reduced both the now-all-powerful provinces of the north, and thoſe of the ſouth to deſpotic obedience, and before this, have learned them to implicitly obey—not the *mild reſtrictions* of a Parent-ſtate, but the *will of abſolute monarchs?*

Their anceſtors ſettled under cover of the claim of England to theſe territories, and their deſcendants to this time have been protected there by her power. They therefore cannot look upon themſelves but as holding their country or lands under certain tenures, ſomewhat ſimilar to copyholders, and have, like them, if they diſlike the tenure they hold under, a right to quit the premiſes, but not to hold them without compliance with the terms. But this they regard not, nor even the ſtipulations of their predeceſſors; for the writers in favour of American ſedition ſay, "Children

"or

"or ſucceſſors are not bound by any acts of "their parents or predeceſſors;" which they illuſtrate thus: "If a parent ſhould bind him-"ſelf and deſcendants for ever, for ſlaves, are "they bound by that engagement?" Certainly not. The concluſion is ſo far juſt, but has nothing to do with the point in queſtion; which is, if an individual, or body of men, ſhould accept of lands, or other permanent poſſeſſions, to be held by them and their heirs or ſucceſſors, under certain ſtipulated conditions; are the ſucceſſors entituled to the lands without performing the ſtipulations of their anceſtors? Or ſhould they not in this caſe, revert to the ſucceſſors of the granters?

Perhaps the friends of American oppoſition will ſay, it is ſimilar to the caſe quoted by them, and that the ſucceſſors are no ways bound to perform the covenants of their fathers, becauſe they think them unreaſonable.

We will now put the caſe a little nearer to them, and ſee whether their ſentiments would not change.

Suppoſe theſe friends of America have left to them certain quit rents of lands, granted by their anceſtors, to the predeceſſors of the preſent occupiers, and theſe occupiers tell them, when demanded to perform the ſtipulations of their ſaid predeceſſors, that they have no idea of performing theſe covenants, becauſe made before they were born, conſequently without their conſent; beſides, that

no man had a right to covenant for them, and they will therefore hold their lands without rendering any acknowledgment. In this inſtance, would not the friends of America ſay, the occupiers of, or reſidents on, the land, ought to perform the covenants of their predeceſſors, or entirely give up the premiſes? They moſt certainly would, for here their intereſt would not let them pervert their reaſon.

Many of the Americans, and ſome of their friends in England, were willing to allow a power to the king as an individual, which they will not admit him when he conſiders himſelf as a part of the legiſlative power of the imperial ſtate. Beſides the incongruity of this doctrine, it would be enabling the king, by rendering the different ſtates of the empire independent of each other, any farther than being connected under the ſame ſovereign, to raiſe ſupplies in, and wage war with one of his dependent territories or kingdoms againſt another, or perhaps againſt the imperial ſtate, and in the end, bring them all to an entire dependence on his will.

Now ſetting aſide the right of England, according to the laws and cuſtoms of civilized nations, to the property of the lands, which right, as well as that of the aborigines, the native Indians, (which government is intituled to from purchaſe of them) is a claim ſuperior to that of the Americans; the Colonies ought

to

to have been attached to her, from the principle of their own intereſt; for although England confines them, if they do purchaſe manufactures, &c. to purchaſe of her, ſhe in return gives, beſides her protection, the greateſt encouragement to all their produce:—Inſtance—indigo, hemp, flax, raw ſilk, pot-aſhes, ſtaves, tar, turpentine, pitch, maſts, yards, and bowſprits, fir timber, and deals, (few of which ſhe will receive from other ſtates without conſiderable duties) ſhe encouraged from America by great bounties.

Now all or moſt of theſe are raw materials, which, if ſhe could even produce herſelf, it would be her intereſt to import them from Ruſſia or elſewhere, provided ſhe came by them much cheaper, becauſe they are the baſis of many manufactures, whoſe price muſt conſequently be leſſened, and conſumption and exportation increaſed: therefore employment to a greater number of hands, reſulting from her purchaſing thoſe raw materials, it becomes her intereſt to do ſo. Hence it plainly appears England, in ſome inſtances, prefers the intereſt of her Colonies to her own.

Moſt branches of commerce in their infancy require ſome encouragement, if they have to contend with rival articles long eſtabliſhed:—It therefore was good policy in this country to give a bounty on hemp, tar, pot-aſh, &c. from America, both to render us leſs dependent on Ruſſia, Sweden, and Germany, and to reduce,

by the greater plenty and competition, the price of thoſe articles; but when the end is anſwered it ſhould ceaſe, or there ſhould then at the moſt be only as much difference * in favour of American produce, as is equal to the advantage reaped by the manufactures with which we buy it, even ſuppoſing the ſame articles from other countries to be purchaſed entirely with ſpecie or bullion.

* That is, the amount of the bounty on the article from America, and duty, if any, on the import from elſewhere.

SECTION VII.

Better to render the New England Colonies independent, than keep them on their former footing: The advantages and inconveniencies of it conſidered.

SHOULD the New England Colonies, from their great concerns in ſhipping and fiſheries, be unwilling to yield the Mother-country, beſides the power of external taxation, the ſole navigation of the whole empire (except as before provided) it would be infinitely better to part with, and allow them independency, than admit their allegiance on other terms.

The conſequence of parting with theſe Colonies, from which we draw no ſtaple commodities, can never be of eſſential detriment to this country; for it is not to be ſuppoſed their commercial connexions with us would immediately ceaſe, if ever they do ſo; becauſe in many articles they would find it their advantage to deal with us, being cheaper ſupplied than they could elſewhere.

But ſuppoſing the worſt, that out of diſaffection and inveteracy to the Parent-ſtate, they ſhould reſolve to purchaſe nothing of her; the loſs attending this will admit of no compariſon with what we ſuffer from their rivalſhip in the Newfoundland and northern fiſhery,

fiſhery, and interference in the carrying trade of the ſouthern Colonies.

Now let us view the conſequence to themſelves of their becoming independent:

In the firſt place, they will loſe all their fiſhery on the banks of Newfoundland, Nova-Scotia, and Labrador, with the carriage of theſe fiſh to market, and their ſhare of ſupplying the reſidents on the 'land, and the fiſhermen and ſhipping from Ireland and England with flour and proviſions. All of which are great ſources of riches to themſelves, and of employment to a vaſt number of their ſailors.

2dly, They will certainly loſe the ſupplying of the Britiſh Weſt Indies with lumber and proviſions, becauſe that will be done from our other Colonies, and the Mother-country.

3dly, Their carrying trade for the ſouthern Colonies muſt ceaſe of courſe. And

Laſtly, As a further aggravation to all this loſs of commerce, their taxes, which have hitherto not been felt, will become very perceptible; and the more ſo, as their commerce, which would have raiſed a conſiderable part of them, will be diminiſhed.

To maintain their independency, and give them weight in the political ſcale, a naval and military power will be required; and to maintain theſe, conſiderable ſums muſt be raiſed. Beſides, it is highly probable their civil and executive eſtabliſhments will become more expenſive,

penſive, as they will aſſume a greater degree of ſplendour than when dependent on another ſtate.

As their independency will occaſion a conſiderable loſs of trade, and vaſt increaſe of taxes, we may venture to ſay ten-fold, it will follow, that both individuals and the community at large will feel theſe ill effects, and the natural conſequence will be a conſiderable emigration to thoſe Colonies ſtill in allegiance to the Parent-ſtate, where they may live unburthened with the weight of internal taxes, and conſequently be enabled to ſell the produce of their induſtry to more advantage.

It may perhaps be urged, that however unfavourable this picture is of Northern-colony independency, the ſtate of thoſe Colonies would be little better, ſhould they, by accepting the propoſed mode of allegiance, give up the major part of their navigation, or active commerce by ſea. To me it appears the latter alternative would be the more eligible of the two; for although they would loſe the advantage of carrying their own articles to Europe, &c. they would not the profit of raiſing and ſelling them, and the eaſe of being free from any heavy internal tax. Beſides, as the loſs of the greateſt part of their navigation would turn their minds to manufactures for their own conſumption, it would become neceſſary for this kingdom to give them due advantages to divert their attention from them.

The

The great ſtaples of the ſouthern Colonies, from the profit attending them, being ſuperior to either manufactures or navigation, ſolely occupy the induſtry of the inhabitants, and will continue to do ſo until people become more plentiful than land; the reſult of which will be a gradual decreaſe in the price of labour, till wages become nearly the ſame as in the manufacturing countries in Europe. Then, and not till then, whilſt the Colonies remain dependent, can manufactures flouriſh, (unleſs in bulky articles) becauſe they can be had cheaper from the parent ſtate, and even at this period, by proper policy, the Colony manufactures may be greatly retarded.

The foundation of all manufactures are raw materials, which either are produced at home or abroad; if the former, Britain may enhance the price by bounties on exportation to herſelf, equal or ſuperior to the freight both ways, ſo as to enable her manufacturers to ſupply the Colonies as cheap as they could make them: Or if the manufactures be from foreign raw materials, ſhe may prevent them, by heavy duties on the entry, or an abſolute prohibition.

The northern Colonies are now arrived at that degree of population which renders manufactures * and the culture of land near equally

* Some houſes in Philadelphia and New-York had, before the breaking out of the preſent troubles, agents over here to endeavour to procure workmen, who underſtood the crown glaſs manufactory, to ſet forward and carry on this fabric in America.

advan-

advantageous, and their entering into the former would render them of little ſervice as Colonies; therefore, as obſerved before, it would demand our immediate attention to turn their minds from this, or ſuch part of it, as would interfere with England, by procuring them ſome equally or more beneficial employment. The only produce of their cultivated lands that we do not raiſe is flax-ſeed, which is conſumed in Ireland and Scotland in great quantities for ſowing, and might, with due encouragement, be imported in large quantities to England, for cruſhing or making oil, in the place of the many cargoes we import from Ruſſia, Germany, France and Italy for that purpoſe. There is therefore room to give them additional employment in the raiſing of this article.

Pot-aſh is another article or ſtaple, not interfering with us, that we might encourage to a ſuperior degree, ſo as to leſſen the importation of it from Germany, by the means of greater bounties * on the one, or heavier duties † on the other.

Fir timber is an article we are in want of, but that cannot, from its being a commodity of great bulk in proportion to its value, be

* On the propriety and extent of bounties, ſee the concluſion of the laſt ſection.

† It is ſeldom expedient to encreaſe the duties on foreign articles, for fear the ſtate they come from ſhould, in return, raiſe the charges on their import of our own produce or manufactures.

ever made to anſwer to any great extent. It will do beſt to Ireland and the weſt part of this kingdom, becauſe, the freight from America is lower, and proportionably higher from the Baltic, than to the ports on the eaſt ſide.

As timber for ſhip-building is ſo ſcarce with us, it might be neceſſary to permit them to build ſhips for exportation or for ſale, (manned with Britiſh ſeamen) as it would be a means of enabling us by being ſupplied with ſhipping cheaper than we otherwiſe ſhould be, to rival more ſucceſsfully the other European States, but how far it would be proper to ſuffer them to be ſold to foreigners, is a point not ſo eaſily determined.

In favour of it it may be urged, that diſpoſing of ſhipping as a Colony produce, is the ſame as ſelling to other powers, pot aſhes or indigo, from the ſame places, and conſequently a means of bringing the ballance of trade ſo much more in our favour, and encreaſing our relative riches.

On the other hand it may be aſſerted, that by ſelling ſhips to our rivals cheaper than they otherwiſe could come by them, which is the only inducement and reaſon they can have for buying them, we enable them more effectually to rival and undermine us in our ſea-commerce, by furniſhing them the means of carrying it on with leſs capital, or the hire of leſs money (in intereſt and inſurance) which

is

is the ſame as if we enabled them to do it with proportionate leſs wages or hire of ſeamen.

Beſides, by raiſing a greater competition of buyers, we ſhould probably enhance to ourſelves, the price of this foundation of all ſea-commerce; and therefore, in a duplicate degree, deprive ourſelves, by the ſelling of ſhips to foreigners, of the ſuperior advantages we ſhould otherwiſe have over them in the cheapneſs of navigation, which, if enjoyed, would enable us to ſupply foreigners with the groſs products of our own or other countries, cheaper than any other ſtate could.

If we had it in our power, and were to ſupply foreigners with ſhips much lower than they could either build them or buy them elſewhere, then, indeed, the conſequence would be more detrimental, than the advantage we could reap from ſelling a product of our Colonies—But if the difference be, what we have reaſon to believe it is, no way conſiderable, then the advantage will lay on our ſide, and particularly ſo, if the ropes and ſail-cloth be manufactured in Britain, for then we ſhould not only diſpoſe of our Colony produce, but a conſiderable quantity of our own manufactures.

Before the preſent troubles, the Colony-built veſſels, were equipped with ſails made of Britiſh canvas, and principally with Britiſh cordage; and if theſe differences are cloſed on the

propoſed baſis, it will be in our power to have it ſo again.

Here it may not be improper to notice, that for ſome time paſt, our exportation of cordage, to the northern Colonies in particular, had greatly decreaſed, occaſioned by the ceaſing to allow the drawback of the duty of the hemp, on the export of it in cordage—From the ſame cauſe, we are deprived in a great meaſure, of ſupplying the Cape de Verds, Madeira, the Canaries, &c. with conſiderable quantities of that manufacture.

Hemp from Ruſſia, &c. pays a duty of 3s. $2\frac{6}{10}$d. per cwt. and cordage manufactured of this hemp, on its export * was entituled to a draw back of 2s. $4\frac{1}{4}$d. per cwt. which was, and ſtill continues to be highly neceſſary, to give due encouragement to the export of that manufacture.

Spain annually receives from Ruſſia, conſiderable quantities of cordage, which Britain might afford to ſend her, was the duty on the raw material, as good policy requires, drawn back.

I have now endeavoured to point out the mutually advantageous connections there might be between us and the Colonies, and that it would be the intereſt of even the New England provinces to accede to the propoſed ſyſtem, rather than become independent: Likewiſe

* By an act of 6 Geo. III. which expired in the 12 Geo. III.

that

that we are intereſted to accept of their allegiance on no other terms. It even appears a matter of doubt, whether it would be adviſeable to accept of their allegiance at all, becauſe from their turbulent and ſeditious ſpirit, they would ſooner or later occaſion, as they have done now, an inſurrection of the continent, either with or without the leaſt provocation on our part.—Were they but independent, an antipathy would ſoon ſubſiſt between them and the other Colonies; as they would then look on each other as ſeparate people, poſſeſſed of different intereſts.

However it will no doubt be contended, that the independency of theſe provinces will greatly affect our Weſt India poſſeſſions, by the loſs of their conſumption of molaſſes and rum. This loſs will not be ſo conſiderable as may be imagined, becauſe theſe Colonies have all along, by illicit practices, conſumed much greater quantities of French * Iſland molaſſes and rum, under cover of its being from our own iſlands, than can well be imagined. Their inducement was its cheapneſs in the French Iſlands, owing to France laying great reſtrictions on their rum, becauſe it would interfere with brandy, her own produce.

* In 1763 was imported into Maſſachuſets Bay 15,000 hogſheads of molaſſes, all of which, except leſs than 500, came from ports that are foreign. The value of theſe, at 1s. 4d. a gallon, a medium price, is £. 100,000.

Governor Barnard's Letter.

In

In peace they effect the free introduction of thoſe articles, partly by the negligence or indulgence of their own revenue officers, particularly in the article of molaſſes, for if the duty of 3d.* a gallon had been fully collected, it would have amounted almoſt to a prohibition, from its being at leaſt 25 per cent. on the original coſt, when the ſame article, the produce of our own iſlands, was imported duty-free. If it had been two-thirds or one-half the amount, it might have bore putting ſtrictly in execution, and would have raiſed a conſiderable revenue. It would not be our intereſt to prohibit theſe articles from the foreign iſlands, becauſe it would put a ſtop to our Northern-colony exports to them, and prevent a proportional demand of articles from Britain; though at the ſame time it is adviſeable to lay on as heavy a duty as the foreign molaſſes would well bear, that the planters in our own iſlands, by obtaining a greater price for theſe articles, may be able, as much as poſſible, to underſell foreigners in ſugar, the principal object. The northern Coloniſts purchaſe more in the French Iſlands than the value of their exports thither, and pay for the deficiency with the ſpecie they have received for the ſale of lumber, &c. at our own.

* By 4 Geo. III. chap. 15, the duty on foreign molaſſes and ſyrups was reduced to 3d. per gallon, to take place from and after the 29th of September, 1764. Previous to that period, it was, by 6 Geo. II. chap. 13. 6d. a gallon.

In

In time of war with France they contrive to carry on the trade in French rum and molaſſes, under cover of pretended captures, cartel ſhips, &c.

But even ſuppoſing that Britiſh iſland rum and molaſſes are conſumed in ſuch conſiderable quantities in the New England Provinces, that the loſs of it would be ſenſibly felt; our ſouthern Colonies, from having a greater ſale for their lumber by as much as went before from New England, would take a greater quantity of rum and molaſſes in return; and if this be not ſufficient, due encouragement might be given, by leſſening in the Mother-country the duty on rum, or encreaſing that on brandy and geneva: the latter of which might be more adviſeable, as it would not enable the lower claſs of people to indulge themſelves to their own detriment, more than they do in the pernicious practice of drinking ſpirits.

From what has been already advanced, it will appear, there will be little chance the New England Colonies (New Hampſhire, Maſſachuſets Bay, Rhode Iſland, and Connecticut) becoming ſo powerful in conſequence of their independence, ſhould that take place, as to endanger the ſafety of the reſt of our poſſeſſions. Their utmoſt limits ſhould be confined to their preſent bounds; then they will be ſo perfectly ſurrounded by us, and ſo good a communication afforded by Hudſon's River, the

the Lakes Sacrament and Champlain, the Rivers Sorel, St. Lawrence, St. Croix, Kennebec, and the ſea, that they might, in caſe of war, be attacked from all quarters.

Beſides, theſe Colonies having no communication themſelves with the lakes, can never interfere with us in the fur and peltry trade, which, next to the fiſheries, is the moſt eſſential benefit we can reap from northern ſettlements.

SECTION VIII.

Independency of the Britiſh American Colonies, contrary to the intereſt of the European maritime powers. Conſequence of this independency to Britain, and the reſt of Europe. Intereſt of Britain rather than loſe the whole, to divide part of her American provinces with ſome of the maritime ſtates of Europe.

WE have already viewed the conſequences of the independency of the New England Provinces, both to themſelves and the Mother-country, the effect of which, to the latter, is of little moment.—But now we will ſuppoſe the general independency of the whole Britiſh Colonies, and a *perfect union* amongſt them. Should theſe take place, it would not be an event ſo deſirable in Europe, even by our rivals, as politicians may in general imagine.

To view it in its worſt light to us, let us ſuppoſe it followed by an immediate French and Spaniſh war.

It will be ſaid, that we cannot, after having exhauſted the power of the nation, and loſt ſo conſiderable a branch of our trade, which bore a proportionate part of our taxes, be able to raiſe the extra ſupplies for the war.

Poſſibly we might not; but what would be the conſequence? A general bankruptcy of the ſtate. This would ruin many individuals of

theſe kingdoms, and at the ſame time, as great part of the debt is due to foreigners, would have as deplorable conſequences in other countries. This calamity ought, in juſtice and equity, to be avoided; but neceſſity has no law, and therefore the inconvenience muſt be diſpenſed with, the ſame as it has been oftener than once in France. Let us ſee its national conſequences on the other ſide. We ſave an annual payment to the national creditors of £.4,464,071, and apply this great ſum to the purpoſe of the war, which will be quite, or almoſt equal to the extra expences, above the peace eſtabliſhment, and thereby relieve the people from any further burthens: But ſhould this ſaving be not ſufficient, it is only having recourſe to that excellent method laid down by Poſtlethwaite in his *Great Britain's True Syſtem* on the raiſing the ſupplies within the year, which he ſhews might always have been done without effecting the labouring claſs, and without further funding, by laying certain Poll Taxes on thoſe ſuperior ranks * of the people that are able to bear them.

The

* Mr Poſtlethwaite ſuppoſed the number of ſubjects able to bear Poll Taxes to be in the following claſſes and proportions, viz.

1 Temporal Lords	250
2 Spiritual Lords	26
3 Baronets, Knights, and Eſquires	4,500
4 Gentlemen	14,000
5 Perſons in great offices	6,000
6 Ditto in leſſer ditto	9,000

7 Eminent

The whole export trade to all our American Continental Colonies *, is only eſtimated at £.3,097,500 per annum; therefore ſuppoſing it would flow there by no other channels, and that it was all profit, it would not be equal to the advantage derived from the non-payment of £.4,464,071, the annual intereſt of the national debt.

7	Eminent Merchants and Traders, Monied Men and Bankers	3,000
8	Leſſer ditto	12,000
9	Law, and its ſuperior Dependents	15,000
10	Eminent Clergymen	2,000
11	Leſſer ditto	12,000
12	Freeholders of better ſort	30,000
13	Ditto leſſer	125,000
14	Farmers	180,000
15	Perſons in liberal arts, and Phyſicians, Chymiſts, &c.	30,000
16	Shopkeepers and Tradeſmen	100,000
17	Artificers and Handicrafts	80,000
18	Officers of the Navy, Captains of India-men, and other principal Ships	10,000
19	Military Officers	7,000
		639,776

Brokers, Agents, &c. &c. he ſuppoſes will make, with the above, one million; each diviſion to be taxed according to what be deemed equal to the abilities of that rank, but upon the whole, to average £.3 or 4 as exigencies may require; and this, for the greater eaſe of payment, to be collected monthly.

If this be not ſufficient, he adviſes a tax on ſaddle horſes, &c. to this we may add, as equal articles of luxury, a tax on livery ſervants, dogs, public places of diverſion, &c. the whole of which might be collected without creating any new officers, after the ſame manner, and for the ſame allowances, (6d. in the pound) as the Land-tax.

* Hudſon's Bay included, viz. £.16,000.

The non-payment of the national debt, or public failure, may be looked upon as a political evil by ſome; becauſe, ſay they, in caſe of great emergency, the public faith will be loſt. This we have little reaſon to think; for did not Lewis XV. borrow or fund money upon better terms than even his predeceſſor did, although there had been a general failure of the national debt contracted by Lewis XIV? This is not to be wondered at, for certainly there is a greater probability of a nation's being able to pay a ſmall debt, than ever to diſcharge a large one, eſpecially when it ſtill continues funding, till in the end the intereſt muſt ſwallow up the national revenue, and ceaſe to be paid of courſe.—Thus ultimately muſt the debt be diſcharged.

However, ſuppoſing the credit of the nation to be entirely or in a great meaſure loſt, the conſequence would rather be advantageous, for then we ſhould be always obliged to raiſe the ſupplies, or moſt of them, within the year, which, by the means afore-mentioned, is not impracticable, and would not only, if it took place, prevent in future the ſubject being oppreſſed by too heavy taxes, but in a great meaſure deſtroy the influence of any miniſtry that might wiſh to corrupt the people, or their repreſentatives. A further reſult from the eaſe of taxes would be, our manufactures would encreaſe, from a greater demand being occaſioned by our affording them cheaper through the conſequent decreaſe of wages.

We

We have now ſhewn the worſt conſequences to ourſelves, from the loſs or independence of America, would be an abolition of the national debt, which, though a loſs to individuals, would be a great national advantage: What we have further to conſider is, the conſequence to the reſt of Europe.

In all probability one of the firſt would be South America, as well as the Spaniſh northern ſettlements, which in a conſiderable degree groan under European ſervitude, would, for real evils, follow the example the north-eaſtern parts have ſet them, though only actuated by imaginary ones: And Spain and Portugal, who would loſe the moſt, as likewiſe France and Holland, would find it very difficult, or even impoſſible, if the ſuppoſed independent Britiſh Colonies, or Britain herſelf out of revenge, ſhould aſſiſt the inſurgents either privately or avowedly, to bring them again to their ſtate of dependence.

The American continent once independent, the European ſtates, we may fear, would find it impoſſible to hold their poſſeſſions in the Weſt Indies; and when ſtript of theſe, with a conſequent part of their maritime power, which would be not only a loſs to them, but ſo much increaſe to that of the American ſtates, they might even dare to inſult the coaſts of Europe with impunity, and, if not entirely reverſe the tables, by eſtabliſhing garriſons on our continent, or in the Britiſh Iſles, might poſſeſs them-

themſelves of the European ſettlements in the Eaſt Indies, and conſequently remove the ſeat of empire and of arts acroſs the Atlantic. This idea will not be viſionary, but only ſomewhat farther diſtant, though not leſs certain, ſuppoſing the Colonies of the Spaniards, &c. not to revolt, becauſe from the ſituation and climate of the Britiſh Colonies, with the great increaſe of manufactures and population conſequent of their becoming independent, they would be ſo powerful and ſenſible of it, that they would not long reſiſt their inclinations to invade Mexico and Chili, and they, with the other provinces, would in the end fall before them, as the ſouthern ſtates of Europe formerly did to the Goths and Vandals of the North.

Therefore, it appears, the intereſt of all the maritime ſtates, or of Europe in general, not to ſuffer the independency of our American Colonies; but as the advantage of keeping them, more immediately reſults to Britain than to the other European ſtates, they might not, even in caſe of neceſſity, be inclined to lend her any active aſſiſtance, without which, all efforts might be vain. In this caſe it would be prudent, rather to ſave a part only, than loſe the whole. This dilemma, it is improbable we ſhall be reduced to, but ſhould we be at that unfortunate paſs, then to ſave our ſouthern or ſtaple Colonies, the moſt valuable to us, we might return to the Dutch,

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their New Netherlands, or province of New York; to the Swedes, their antient poſſeſſions of New Jerſey; and to the French, reſtore Canada.—Thus the New England Colonies ſurrounded by other ſtates, and cut off from the ſouthern provinces, could bring about no inſurrections in them, and be themſelves the more eaſily kept in due allegiance to the Parent-ſtate, ſo as to render them a poſſeſſion worth keeping; but ſhould dire neceſſity require it, we might give up our claim to them to other ſtates, in conſequence of their aſſiſtance, to recover to ourſelves the ſouthern provinces.

With theſe, and our northern poſſeſſions of Nova Scotia, Newfoundland, Labrador, and Hudſon's Bay*, all which afford conſiderable fiſheries, and the two latter a trade with the Indians for furs†, which might, if laid open, be greatly increaſed, ſo as perhaps to equal our preſent ſupplies from Canada, and from Albany and Oſwego.

* At preſent a conſiderable number of whales are yearly caught in Hudſon's Bay, by the Eſquimaux, and was the navigation not reſtrained by the excluſive charter to the Hudſon's Bay company, a very valuable whale and ſeal fiſhery might be carried on by private adventurers.

† Hudſon's Bay exports, in ſkins, with a ſmall quantity of feathers, ſome whale bone, and a few tons of oil, amount to £. 29,340. Its imports (of nearly the ſame articles as Newfoundland) are valued at £. 16,000. And the company employ, beſides a few ſchooners and ſmall veſſels in the Bay, 4 ſhips, manned with about 130 men, in their trade to and from London.

From

From this diſpoſition of our northern Colonies to other ſtates, or, in general, reſtoration of them to their former European poſſeſſors, we ſhould not have much to fear, becauſe, though they might collectively be able to overpower the ſouthern Colonies reſerved to ourſelves, yet from the different ſtates they belonged to, this would be little to be dreaded, and any of them ſeparately would be no match to contend with.

SECTION IX.

On improvements at home—Union with Ireland—Advantages of it conſidered—Britiſh iſles, their fiſheries capable of great improvement—The means that will effect it—Meaſures for the eaſier manning of the navy—Ill execution of the revenue laws in Scotland—Reviſion of poor laws.

IT more immediately concerns a kingdom to cheriſh the intereſts of any iſlands or ſtates of limited extent, dependent upon it, than its Colonies, ſettled in provinces of almoſt unlimited extent, on a great continent; becauſe her poſſeſſion of, or alliance with the latter, can only be temporary, and from the nature of things muſt ſooner or later ceaſe; which, period, even at the lateſt, will be when the extended country becomes ſo populous as to afford ſuch a ſurplus of inhabitants, over what are wanted for agriculture, as to occaſion the people to aſſemble in towns for commercial purpoſes; becauſe they will then find their power, and ſoon be inclined to uſe it, if they think they lay under any reſtraint, which, whether juſt or no, the groſs of the people may eaſily be made to think is real, by thoſe turbulent ſpirits, whoſe intereſts or paſſions may induce them to promote ſedition.

Let us now enquire, whether we have improved, to the utmoſt advantage, thoſe iſlands that are dependent on Britain.

Ireland firſt preſents itſelf to view—A kingdom, looked on by our legiſlature, in moſt inſtances, as a foreign power, rather than one ſo nearly allied; reſtrained in her commerce and manufactures, yet ready to bear a great ſhare of our burthens.

We have indeed encouraged her linen-manufactures, and of late been ſo kind as to give a bounty on the importation of flax-ſeed, from ſome parts of Europe, to ſow her lands, ſince they have been deprived of this article from America. Some other recent inſtances of Britiſh kindneſs might likewiſe be mentioned. But what will moſt effectually anſwer the end, will be to allow Ireland the ſame commercial privileges with ourſelves. This they cannot reaſonably expect, without bearing equal portions of the public burthen with ourſelves, and that cannot be exactly determined, without the ſame revenue laws take place in each kingdom, which it follows muſt be paſſed by one and the ſame legiſlature, therefore to effect this, a union is obviouſly neceſſary.

Let us now conſider the effects in either iſland, and what objections they can have againſt it.

The people of Ireland may object to an union, becauſe they may be higher taxed. Upon conſideration, they will find this have no weight, becauſe a majority of the Iriſh parliament are ever ready to anſwer the miniſter's demands.

A ca-

A capital objection lays from the city of Dublin, and landholders in its vicinity, from the ſeat of government being removed. This loſs to them would be only temporary, and none in the long run. Has the city of Edinburgh decreaſed, or has it not rather increaſed ſince the throne was removed? Might not the ſame be expected of Dublin?

The inhabitants of Ireland are eſtimated only to be two millions and a half, although it is evident from its great export of proviſions, and from the great quantity of lands yet in a bad ſtate of culture, and other parts not cultivated at all, that twice the number, or five millions might be maintained in the kingdom, without having recourſe elſewhere, for the neceſſaries of life.—A kingdom, in which the ballance of trade in manufactures, excluſive of native produce, is equal, may have ſuch a degree of population, as will conſume the whole produce of its lands. But when its exports of manufactures exceed its imports of foreign articles, a territory may then maintain in proportion to this exceſs, many times the number of inhabitants its produce will ſupport, as we ſee exemplified in Holland—Now, we know the Iriſh are reſtrained in their export of woollen manufactures, and that, beſides the wool (and woollen yarn) the Engliſh take from them, they ſupply the French in contraband trade, with great quantities; therefore the conſequence of non-re-

ſtraint would be, they would manufacture their wool themſelves: This would occaſion a demand for more manufacturers: That, and the cheapneſs of proviſions, would bring them from foreign countries, and prevent the emigration of the Iriſh to France and Spain * for want of employment at home.

This would increaſe the number of ſubjects and commerce of the kingdom, and at the ſame time, prevent our rivals being ſupplied with wool, or at leaſt occaſion them to receive it in leſs quantities, and at an advanced rate, which would enhance the price of their manufactures, and deſtroy their competition.

No country in the world is better ſituated for trade than Ireland, from the excellency and number of its ports, therefore, what but reſtraint can prevent it from flouriſhing.

The increaſe of inhabitants from theſe conſequences, would occaſion a home conſumption for every article the land produces or maintains, and conſequently increaſe the value to its poſſeſſors; and whilſt moſt other towns were increaſing in population, value of lands, manufactures and commerce, the city of Dublin could not go without her increaſe of the

* To recruit the Iriſh Brigades in the French and Spaniſh ſervice, frequently employed againſt ourſelves—A union and perfect freedom of trade, beſides preventing this ill effect, would ſo attach the Iriſh to this government, as to take away all neceſſity of keeping an armed force in that country to prevent inſurrections, and obviate every fear of their aſſiſting the Spaniards, in caſe of an invaſion.

two

two latter, which would compenſate for the loſs of the reſidence of the Vice-Roy.

From England being the ſeat of the executive and legiſlative powers of the empire, which muſt always draw a confluence of men of great eſtates to ſpend their incomes there, it may be ſaid Ireland will be leſs able to bear her ſhare of the public taxes; but will not the ſame argument hold in favour of Weſtmoreland, Cumberland, and all the diſtant counties in England, which reap no more benefit than Ireland, from the confluence of riches in London?

Number of inhabitants are of more moment than extent of territory, becauſe they encreaſe the field of taxation and real ſtrength; and the more connected that ſtrength, the better will it be able to act, and the more capable of great efforts. Thus if by any means we can encreaſe the number of ſubjects in the Britiſh iſles, it would certainly compenſate for the loſs of them in America.

The moſt material objection England can have againſt a perfect union with Ireland, will ariſe from the towns and counties engaged in the woollen manufacture, becauſe of the rivalſhip of the Iriſh; but is it not better the Iriſh ſhould rival us than the French; for would not the Iriſh, when united to us, be the ſame to the ſtate as the people of any particular town or county in England? Beſides, the Iriſh encreaſe of trade in the woollen manufacture

facture could not ariſe from any material diminution of our own, but from that of the French, who get the principal part of their ſurplus of wool.

At preſent we may ſuppoſe none of their wool is thrown away, but either manufactured by themſelves or the French (except the little that comes to England); therefore, conſidering our Engliſh manufacturers as individuals abſtract from the ſtate, what matters it to them whether the Iriſh wool be wrought by themſelves, or any other people who go to the ſame market, ſince it is evident that for ſometime at leaſt no more wool can be manufactured than before; therefore the rivalſhip will be the ſame, and when we conſider the French cannot make many of their ſtuffs to perfection without a conſiderable mixture of Engliſh or Iriſh wool, it will follow, that the Iriſh, working all their wool themſelves, will give an advantage to the Engliſh manufacturers they had not before; and even when the breed of ſheep in Ireland is encreaſed, ſo as to afford a larger quantity of wool, the Iriſh can have no advantage over the Britiſh manufacturers, but what may ariſe from the cheapneſs of labour. The rate of this we have ſhewn principally depends on the price of proviſions, and that by following ſuch meaſures as are laid down in the 4th Section, proviſions and labour might be as low in England as in any manufacturing country what-

whatſoever; and that the Engliſh, ſo far from fearing a decreaſe, might expect an increaſe in every manufacture. What advantage the Iriſh might at firſt have in the price of proviſions, would be counterbalanced by their number of manufacturers being unequal to their increaſed demand, which, during this ſcarcity, would advance the rate of labour until a ſufficient number were bred up to the buſineſs, or manufacturers from other countries induced to go over by the highneſs of wages and cheapneſs of proviſions. At this period, when they have manufacturers ſufficient, *and proviſions uniformly low, from the free export and import*, the price of labour would lower.

From the increaſe of trade and population in Ireland, the taxes and burthens of the ſtate would be more divided, and might conſequently fall the lighter on Britain, to the advantage of her landed intereſt, manufacturers, and every other claſs of individuals; therefore ſo far from the proſperity of Ireland being to be feared, it is an event ardently to be deſired by every inhabitant of this country.

Now as to the ſmaller Britiſh Iſles, the Iſle of Man,* the Hebrides, Orcades, and Shetland,† the principal improvement they will admit

* The Iſles of Wight, Sheppey, &c. affording nothing peculiar from their ſituations, need no particular diſcuſſion.

† The fiſhery of the Iſle of Man is for herrings, which they have greatly improved ſince the ſovereignty of that iſland

admit of, is an increaſe of their fiſheries, which, notwithſtanding the encouragement the legiſlature has given, are far from being in that ſtate of perfection they will admit of.

The principal reaſon that appears for their not being ſo, and for the Dutch, upon our own coaſts, almoſt from the Firth of Forth all the way to the north of Shetland, carrying it on ſo advantageouſly, and without any bounty, is not their ſuperior knowledge in the curing of the fiſh, which could not long be peculiar to them, but only the lowneſs of their ſailors' wages, and their proviſions, and the high rates of thoſe with us, the difference

iſland has been purchaſed by government, being in ſome meaſure obliged to turn their attention to it by the loſs of their ſmuggling trade. The Hebrides, or the weſtern iſles of Scotland, at the proper ſeaſons, abound with herring, cod, and ling. The herrings in ſome years have come into their lochs or bays in ſuch ſhoals that they have been ſold for 6d. per barrel, and for want of caſks or ſalt have been frequently uſed as manure for their lands. Charles I. greatly encouraged the fiſhery in theſe parts, but the civil wars deſtroyed the good effects that might have been expected.

Charles II. greatly promoted for ſome time, the weſtern iſland fiſhery, having himſelf a great ſhare in a company aſſociated for that purpoſe. They eſtabliſhed ſtores of ſalt, caſks, &c. at Loch Maddie, in the iſle of North Uiſt, and might have gone on ſucceſsfully, had not the neceſſities of that luxurious monarch occaſioned him to withdraw his ſhare of ſtock, which brought on the diſſolution of the company.

The fiſheries of Shetland are for ling, cod, and tuſk. Thoſe of the Orkneys are the ſame, but at preſent very inconſiderable.

Braſſey Sound, in Shetland, is the rendezvous for the herring buſſes; they begin their fiſhery on the 24th of June, and keep with the ſhoals of herrings as they move ſouthward.

being

being at leaſt twenty or thirty per cent.—full ſufficient to give almoſt the monopoly to the Dutch.

The wages of ſailors, as their food, when employed, is always found them, do not ſeem dependent on the price of proviſions; but if we conſider the ſubject, we ſhall find, that when, from the uniform lowneſs of proviſions, the rates of all labour on ſhore are reduced, the rate of wages at ſea cannot, as now, remain from twenty to fifty per cent. higher than in all other nations; becauſe theſe claſſes of the people that muſt labour, and have profeſſions to chuſe of, would certainly prefer in general, that which gave the greateſt encouragement; this preference would create great plenty of ſailors, and occaſion wages to lower from the number wanting employment, which they could nevertheleſs procure no where to greater advantage, until the wages of ſeamen, in the commerce of theſe kingdoms, fell below thoſe of other nations, of which there is little probability. The hire of fiſhermen on the coaſt, will be lowered by the ſame cauſes, which will likewiſe occaſion thoſe, who fiſh in their own boats, to ſell their produce for leſs.

When wages and proviſions, through the reſult of a *free import and export*, ſhall have fallen here as low as in Holland, ſhall we not be able to carry on the fiſheries *on our own coaſts* to as much advantage as the Dutch?

Certainly we ſhall, and even more ſo, from our ſituation on the ſpot.

We have an undoubted right to preſerve thoſe fiſheries to ourſelves; but from the commercial advantages we reap from the Dutch, they are in ſome degree entituled to a ſhare in the eaſtern Scottiſh * fiſhery, the poſſeſſion of which amply repays them. The men employed by Holland in the Scottiſh and Engliſh † fiſheries, and in carrying the produce to market, are computed to be 200,000; beſides theſe, about one-fourth as many are, in conſequence of theſe fiſheries, employed on ſhore, in the building of ſhips, making nets, curing the fiſh, &c. &c.

Therefore, ſuppoſing us only to come in for one-half of what the Dutch enjoy, we ſhall gain, beſides employment to upwards of 12,000 artificers, an acceſſion of 100,000 ſeamen, two-thirds of which would be always on our coaſts, ready to man our fleets on every emergency. A moſt noble reſource!

This ſhews, in the ſtrongeſt manner, the *abſolute neceſſity there is for the free import and export of grain and proviſions* ‡; becauſe, from this only can proviſions and wages become lower, and upon the lowneſs of theſe depends the acceſſion of the riches and power attendant on extenſive fiſheries.

* For ling, cod, tuſk, and herrings.
† Yarmouth, &c. for herrings.
‡ Cattle, ſalt proviſions, &c.

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SECTION IX.

The ſame cauſes will produce the ſame effects in the Engliſh * and Iriſh fiſheries †, ſo as to enable them to contribute their ſhare to the grandeur and increaſe of the Britiſh maritime power.

A nation poſſeſſed of numerous ſeamen, one would ſuppoſe could ſeldom be in want of them to man its navy. Yet we find that in England, we are generally obliged to have recourſe to the arbitrary and expenſive method of impreſſing. The chief probable cauſes why men do not enter, are the uncertainty when, if ever, they may be diſcharged; and the knowledge of the great increaſe of wages in the merchant ſervice, always conſequent on the breaking out of a preſs, and during the want of men for the navy. Theſe cauſes Lieut. Thomlinſon, in his excellent plan (which it is ſuppoſed will ſhortly come under the conſideration of the legiſlature) has greatly obviated; but there is one (if I rightly remember) he has not touched on, which has as much weight as any of the reſt, viz. the unequal diſtribution of prize-money; one-fourth only falling to the ſhare of the ſailors and marines. Small as this ſhare is, we find the ſailors always wiſhing for, and ready to enter in a Spaniſh war, becauſe of the probability of rich prizes: Therefore it is

* Coaſt of Cornwall and Devonſhire for pilchards, and that of Norfolk, &c. for herrings.

† Herrings on the north-weſt coaſt, and other parts.

obvious, that were the ſailors' ſhare doubled, they would as ardently enter to ſerve againſt an enemy that might afford half the amount of rich prizes they could have reaſon to expect from the Spaniards, and this they might hope for in a war with almoſt any other power.

As to the ſubdiviſion of prize-money among the officers, this, though not perhaps the moſt equitable, we ſhall not now contend about, but ſuppoſe it to continue the ſame—Therefore, as the three-fourths of the whole prize-money, which is what falls to the ſhare of the officers, is ſubdivided in 6 parts, (viz. $\frac{6}{8}$ *) they might ſtill hold the ſame proportion to each other by calling them $\frac{6}{12}$, thus the ſailors would come in for one-half, which, on account of the great diſproportion in number between them and the officers, can never be deemed unreaſonable, but if it be, let us compromiſe the difference, and call the ſailors' quota only $\frac{4}{12}$.

Many officers urge that the ſailors have already too great a ſhare, becauſe they only waſte what they now get, and if they had more it would go the ſame way—I don't doubt many of the officers do the ſame, there-

* Admiral — — —	1
Captain — — — —	2
Lieutenants, maſter, captain of marines, &c.	1
Boatſwain, carpenter, gunner, &c. —	1
Petty officers — — —	1
	6

If a cruizing ſhip, the captain has then three-eighths (his own and the admiral's) or *once and a half as much as all the ſailors and marines*.

fore

fore the argument will hold againſt their getting ſo much as they do.

Few ſailors indeed ſave what they get, but this matters not to the public, as long as the ſailor's getting and ſpending this money is a great inducement to his defending his country.

We may without any heſitation aſſert, that ſailors would be readily induced to enter into the navy by this increaſe of prize-money, were it joined to a limited time of ſervice, and the impoſition of a heavy penalty on both the paying and receiving of more wages in the merchant ſervice, (either party informing to be exempted) than 40 or 45s. or at moſt 50s. per month, and in proportionate rates for coaſting voyages.

This would take away the great difference betwixt the merchants' and government's pay, and yet being greatly more than the pay of other nations, would be ſufficient to induce foreigners to come into our merchants' ſervice.

That this laſt regulation is highly neceſſary, will appear, when we are told, that in the breaking out of the preſent preſs*, the ſailors in the coal trade, from Newcaſtle to London and back, notwithſtanding the ſhips had protections, demanded and would not ſail without ſix guineas wages, and as this voyage ſeldom exceeds a month, how can it be expected that the preſent bounty of five guineas, high as it is, or even twice that ſum, would induce

* October and November, 1776.

theſe

theſe men to enter on board men of war, to receive 22s. 6d. per month*.

One cauſe that occaſions, among the beſt ſeamen eſpecially, an averſion to the navy is, their being liable, with or without cauſe, to be beat and ill uſed by thoſe frequently their inferiors in the knowledge of their duty, the petty officers†.

We will now return to our principal ſubject from which we have digreſſed.

We have already mentioned how liberal the Iriſh are in the ſums raiſed for public uſe. The ſtate indeed reaps little benefit, but the miſapplication of theſe ſums cannot be laid to their charge, as they might all be applied to the good of the public, and we may hope will be, ſhould a union take place between that country and Great Britain.

* In the navy, 13 months are accounted to a year, ſo that 22s. 6d. per month only, with the allowance of proviſions, is far better pay than that of the ſoldiers, and not much to be complained of.

† Beſides theſe meaſures for manning the navy, without having recourſe to impreſſing, there is another that was once tried with ſucceſs—a voluntary regiſter of ſeamen, that is, to allow to 40 or 50 thouſand ſeamen (or the number that may be thought neceſſary) an annual pay of 40 or 50s. or even £. 3 on theſe ſeamen, regiſtering and engaging to hold themſelves ready on certain notice, to ſerve on board the navy. This would be no great national expence, and perhaps no greater during a whole peace, than the charges of impreſſing during war.

In the reign of William III. this method was at one time followed, and a ſufficient number regiſtered themſelves voluntarily; but the contract was broke on the part of government, by the non-payment of theſe honeſt men.

The

The money raiſed in Britain by taxes, with the charges of collection, are calculated by Doctor Price at near twelve millions, a very conſiderable ſum, and more ſo, when we conſider that England pays nearly the whole of it. Many readers will be ſurprized when they are told the whole exciſes of Scotland, at a medium of three years, ending in 1773, produced only £. 95,229*, and that the whole cuſtoms of that kingdom amounted to no more than £. 68,369. Fraud and colluſion evidently appear on the face of this, and one need not fear to exceed the truth in ſaying, the duties at Glaſgow only, if fully collected†, would amount to more than is now paid by the whole kingdom. That the exciſes are collected in the ſame colluſive manner, can, from their produce, admit of no doubt. It is notorious, that in the glaſs-works and other exciſeable manufactures in Scotland, the revenue is ſo much defrauded as to give them an undue advantage over their fellow-ſubjects in England. This grievance, I am credibly informed, was repreſented to perſons in power, and their anſwer was, they knew of it, but that if it was not permitted, the Scots could

* The groſs produce is £. 43,254 more, the expence of collection.

† To do juſtice to the port of Glaſgow, it is neceſſary to notice, that it is generally allowed the duties are more narrowly inſpected, and fewer frauds committed there, notwithſtanding its greater trade, than in any other port in Scotland.

not,

not, from ſeveral cauſes, carry on theſe works. The foundation of this opinion is much to be doubted; but ſuppoſing it true, works of all kinds ought to be carried on where a combination of favourable circumſtances point out the places, as there only they can be of the moſt advantage to their country: therefore, if any, contrary to the conviction of their ſenſes, will erect fabricks elſewhere, it is proper they ſhould feel the conſequences. Should any man take it into his head to erect works, for inſtance, for the manufacturing of ſoap, paper, or glaſs, on the ſummit of Cheviot Hills, or in the middle of any other wild, where the carriage to and from, and other unfavourable circumſtances prevented their ſucceſs; is government, on this account, to give up the exciſe, or a conſiderable part of it, that the fabrick may be continued? No, for by this means they might ſoon receive no exciſe at all, and yet have no further increaſe of manufactures than they otherwiſe would. Beſides, though the manufacturers were ever ſo much favoured in the payment of the exciſe, we may be aſſured, that when any part of their manufactures are exported, the whole duty will be drawn back, though they have only paid a part of it.

As to the frauds of the cuſtoms, they are even more notorious than of the exciſe.

A few years ſince I heard it aſſerted by thoſe who knew perfectly the trade of the place, that

that in one port where the import of tobacco was very conſiderable, and great quantities ſold inland and coaſtways, the exports (real and pretended) for the drawback were nearly equal to the whole of their imports. Thus did they procure that article almoſt duty-free, to the great diminution of the revenue, and detriment of the fair traders in England.

Not only in tobacco and this one port are ſimilar meaſures practiſed, but in almoſt every other article, and all other ports, as is pretty generally known; and the ſmall ſum of £. 68,369, the whole produce of their cuſtoms, further evinces.

Was there any juſt cauſe for theſe exemptions, or were the Scots oppreſſed by any peculiar taxes, the ill execution of the revenue laws might be overlooked: But when we call to mind, that by the folly or inadvertency of our anceſtors the Scotch were favoured in many exciſes, and almoſt exempted from the land-tax, being by the 9th article of the act of union, when the ſum of £. 1,999,763 . 8 . 4½* ſhall be enacted to be raiſed by land-tax in England, to be only charged with the further ſum of £. 48,000 as their quota, and proportionably for any greater or leſſer ſum.

Scotland, at the loweſt calculation, is ſuppoſed to contain one million and a half of inhabitants, but we have ſeen pays, ſcarce one-

* 4s. in the pound.

fiftieth part the taxes England does, though one-fourth * as populous. Thus, on an average, each individual in the latter kingdom pays the united government upwards of twelve times more than his fellow-ſubject in Scotland, the latter, by ſome miſtake or peculiar indulgence, paying only pounds Scots † in lieu of ſterling.—Is there a ſtate in Europe, of its extent and population, half ſo little burthened with taxes? No, not one! Why then are not the revenue laws ſtrictly executed, ſeeing juſtice and equity demand it?

If there ſhould be any indulgence in theſe, it ſhould be to the people of England, in return for the other peculiar taxes they bear: And if we may venture to riſk a ſuppoſition, it is to theſe particular indulgences that the national animoſity is not yet quite ſubſided: For were Cornwall or any other Engliſh county ſo favoured as our northern neighbours are, would not the reſt of the nation look on that particular county with envy and hatred? A natural effect, and from a cauſe that had its weight in the moſt early ages—Inſtance, Joſeph and his brethren.

If we can by any reformation ſave an amount, it is equivalent to the gaining it. This reflection leads us to conſider the vaſt burthen

* The inhabitants of England are eſtimated to be ſix millions.

† The pound Scots is only 20d. the 12th part of a pound ſterling.

of

of the poor-ceſs; an evil and a grievous tax that has long been complained of. Upon an average it cannot amount to leſs throughout the kingdom than fifteen-pence * in the pound of the full rent, which perhaps may be near equal to 3s. land-tax, conſidering the northern and other counties are not rated to the full, and the little that Scotland pays.—The real rental of the lands of Great Britain cannot well be leſs than 24 millions, and if the poor ceſs be equal to 15d. the amount of this tax will be one million and a half; now was there only a reformation of the poor-laws, and a ſyſtem adopted ſimilar to that in Holland, of finding employment ſuited to the ſtrength and abilities of the different individuals of the poor, their labour, with the additional charge of half a million, might probably maintain them. Thus there would be an annual ſaving and national reſource of one million, which is a tax equally grievous when raiſed for the purpoſe of maintaining the idle part of the poor, as if levied for the exigencies of the ſtate. As the legiſlature had this ſalutary amendment in conſideration laſt ſeſſions of parliament, it is to be hoped they will in the courſe of this, deviſe and paſs into a law ſome plan that may be productive of this great national ſaving.

* In many great towns it exceeds 2s.

SECTION X.

CONSIDERATIONS *on* EAST INDIAN AFFAIRS.

The improvement of our territorial poſſeſſions in Aſia —Meaſures conducive to the intereſt of Britain, and happineſs of her ſubjects in the Indies.

THIS kingdom was very powerful, and of great weight in Europe, before ſhe had any poſſeſſions in America, and may, we have endeavoured to point out, by purſuing proper meaſures, become or continue to be ſo without them, and even without the circuitous connection we now have with them, which, in all probability, at the worſt events, we ſhould ſtill continue; as we find, by the channels of France, Holland, and Hamburg, the Americans have, notwithſtanding they refuſed to take them direct from us, been largely ſupplied with Britiſh articles; as from this, and the demand in Ruſſia and Turkey, occaſioned by the peace between thoſe powers, our manufacturers have not wanted employ. But whether this circuitous traffic ceaſe or no, we may, in conſequence of taking from other powers many articles that we encouraged only from America, procure a greater vend than we ſhould otherwiſe have for our woollen, hardware, cotton, and other manufactures. That by theſe means, advantageous treaties of commerce might be entered into, there can be

no

no reaſon to doubt. However, whether America be reduced or no, there is one great ſource of power and riches that we ought not to neglect. Our territorial poſſeſſions in Aſia might be rendered as valuable a branch of the empire as our American provinces can ever be. We will now enquire by what means.

We know that after the retreat of Coſſim Ally Khan, and defeat of both him and Suja ul Dowla * by Lord Clive, that Shaw Allum (in Aug. 1765) granted to the Eaſt India Company the perpetual dewannee, or receipt of the revenue, of Bengal, Behar, and Oriſſa, at that period yielding annually above 200 lacks of rupees†.

At the ſame time an inſtrument was executed between the King ‡ and Nijam ul Dowla for a yearly tribute of 26 lacks, to be paid into the royal treaſury for holding the ſubahſhip of theſe provinces, for the payment of which the Company became ſecurity; they had then only to ſtipulate with their nominal Subah§, Nijam ul Dowla, to take a certain

* Nabob of Oud, and Grand Vizier of the empire.

† A lack is 100,000 rupees, which at 2s. 6d. is £. 12,500; or at 2s. 4d. as ſometimes computed, (the rupees of different places being different in value) is £. 11,666. 13. 4.

‡ The Great Mogul, Shaw Allum.

§ He had three months before, by the conſent of the Company's ſervants, ſucceeded his father, Meer Jaffier, who after the defeat and death of Suraja ul Dowla had been raiſed to the Muſnud by Lord Clive in the year 1757, but was depoſed without any juſt reaſons in the year 1760, to give place to his ſon-in-law, Coſſim Ally Khan, and afterwards, on the depoſition of Coſſim Ally, reſtored in 1763 to the Subahſhip, which he held till his death, Jan. 7, 1765.

ſum

ſum for his annual expences, which they fixed at 42 lacks. Thus the Company came to the acquiſition of the immenſe revenue of 132 lacks of rupees, or £. 1,650,000 ſterling; in conſideration of which territorial revenue, the Company agreed to pay into the exchequer £. 400,000 annually, unleſs their dividends were not below 12½ per cent, and then to pay a proportionate ſum until they ſhould be reduced to 6 per cent*.

The ill uſe the Company's ſervants made of this power, very ſoon appeared, by the monopoly of ſalt, beetle-nut, and tobacco; articles the natives, through long cuſtom, eſteemed neceſſaries of life. The uſe they made of this monopoly was to obtain, by fixing an extravagant price, all the riches of the inhabitants; and of theſe they ſo effectually drained them, by foul means or fair, that they had not left where-withal to pay their taxes, which were exacted under the name of the Subah, with a rigorous hand.

But the moſt execrable deed of all, was the collecting the country rice into ſtores, and not importing from elſewhere in due time, thro' which means, aided by the ſhort crop in 1769, they, the next year, by holding up the price above the abilities of the Gentoos to pur-

* The laſt payment of this was in 1772. In 1773 the Company, from the exceſs of their former dividends, and greatneſs of their debts, were neceſſitated to reduce their dividend to 6 per cent. and accept a loan from government of £. 1,400,000.

chaſe,

chaſe, brought on a famine that deſolated Bengal, and filled the Ganges with dead—Calcutta preſented to their eyes a ſcene of horror and diſtreſs that was ſcarcely to be parallel'd. To theſe we may add the many ſcenes of blood occaſioned by the bribes received for depoſing and creating Subahs, Nabobs, and Rajas.

The twelve judges lately ſent out with ample ſalaries to ſet them above corruption, we may hope (from what they have already done*) will, in a great meaſure, remedy theſe abuſes—Still it will not be compleat. The national good requires more—*That all the territorial power and revenue be veſted in the grand legiſlature of the empire*†—And by this the Company, as they now manage affairs, would be no great ſufferers, ſeeing they would then be exempted from all future claim of the annual payment of £. 400,000, as well as from the expences of their military and great part of their civil eſtabliſhment, and have, as equity requires it, to be reimburſed the expences of their fortifications, a ſum upwards of three millions, beſides other contingencies that may appear reaſonable.

The revenue of Bengal, &c. from its coming into the Company's hands gradually decreaſed, and on the contrary, their expences,

* In the trials of Nuncomar, &c.

† On the expiration of the Eaſt India Company's charter in 1780.

civil

civil and military, increaſed in the reverſe proportion, ſo that in the courſe of the year 1770, the ſurplus of the revenue was dwindled away to 20 lacks (£. 250,000)—At this time too they had ſtopt 30 lacks out of the tribute to the Emperor, and allowance to the Subah, and ſhortly after, as an inſtance of the good faith to be repoſed in the Company, they kept back the whole of the tribute from Shaw Allum, notwithſtanding the payment of this was the condition under which they became perpetual dewans, or receivers of the revenue of thoſe provinces.

On the ſuppoſition of government's taking into their hands the territorial juriſdiction and revenue of the Britiſh conqueſts in the eaſt, ſome of the out-lines of Major Morriſon's plan ſeem to be almoſt unexceptionable, viz.

"(2.) * That the Eaſt India Company be "confined to commerce alone."

"(3.) That the revenue, the civil, politi- "cal, and military departments be entirely "under the controul of a Vice-Roy, and a "Council of ſixteen, to be appointed by the "Crown, and *accountable to parliament for* "*their conduct*."

"(7.) That the Vice-Roy ſhould have the "whole executive power, but the revenue and "every new deliberative meaſure to fall under

* Theſe are the number of Major Morriſon's articles, of which in all there were 23—See his alliance with the Great Mogul, wherein it appears this worthy officer was ill-treated by the Company's ſervants.

"the

"the conſideration of the Vice-Roy and "Council."

"(16.) That every kind of ſecurity for per-"ſon and property ſhould be proclaimed a-"broad, and religiouſly obſerved (particular-"ly with merchants from Perſia, Tartary, and "other diſtant countries)."

"(19.) That government pay the Company "according to appraiſement for all their forts, "ſtores, and military apparatus, to be made "good by yearly inſtallments out of the re-"venues."*

To thoſe out-lines we may add as an explanation of the laſt ſelected article but one —That trials by jury ſhould be introduced into the Britiſh territories in Hindoſtan, and a code of laws as ſimilar to the Engliſh as may be, but leſs complicated, that the people may be as little oppreſſed as poſſible by the gentlemen of the long robe.

The conſequences of theſe happy laws contraſted to anarchy, inſecurity of property, and perſonal oppreſſion throughout all the Eaſt beſide, would occaſion ſuch a conflux of people, riches and power into the Britiſh provinces, that the trade and revenues would, in all probability, increaſe three-fold.

* We ſuppoſe he means (*as he ſhould*) that the Eaſt India Company ſhould be allowed not only the principal, but intereſt, from the time of their quitting poſſeſſion, on ſuch parts as remain unpaid, until the whole by yearly inſtallments, ſhould be cleared off.

The provinces bordering on the mouth of the Indus, and the Gulphs of Sindi and Cambay, with the greater part of the Concan and Decan, we might, on the eaſy condition of aſſiſting to reinſtate him on his throne*, be inveſted with by the Great Mogul; and thoſe ceded provinces might eaſily be wreſted from under the arbitrary yoke of their uſurpers, to bleſs the inhabitants with the mild and happy government we have premiſed to be eſtabliſhed in Bengal, Behar and Oriſſa.

Thus would the cauſe of Great Britain become the cauſe of mankind, and we ſhould differ from other conquerors, in that we conquered not for ourſelves only, but for the good of the human race. Then would the native tyrants of the Eaſt be obliged to change their conduct, or ſoon have only deſolated regions to reign over, for their ſubjects would fly from the hand of oppreſſion to that aſylum, where perſonal freedom and private property extended their arms to receive them.

And thus would our dominions contain the moſt fertile provinces of Hindoſtan, extend from the Ganges to the Indus, and command the extenſive trade of thoſe great rivers, by means of which we might, in the northern

* He has long been wandering from one Subah or Chief to another, who alternately fleece the people in his name. It would be the intereſt of this country to reinſtate him, as he would, by uniting the now-divided northern parts of the empire, become a barrier againſt the incurſions of the northern powers.

pro-

provinces of the Mogul's empire, in Perſia, and the ſouthern parts of Tartary, ſoon vend more Britiſh manufactures than all America takes from us; and perhaps this Indian territory may give as great employment to our ſhipping, as our American continental Colonies, were the trade left open to all ſubjects reſident in Britain, and not confined to particular aſſociations of men by excluſive charters —How far the Eaſt India Company's excluſive trade to China, and other places ſubject to other powers, may, or may not be beneficial to this kingdom, we ſhall not at preſent contend; but ſurely *it never can be the intereſt of any ſtate, to grant to a particular ſociety the ſole trade between any two parts of its own dominions.*

From the pacific diſpoſition of the Gentoos, and moſt of the other tribes, and the contraſt between the Britiſh government and that of the neighbouring powers, the people, though immenſely numerous, would without reſtraint remain in allegiance to the imperial ſtate. But even ſhould they, from any unforeſeen events, wiſh to become independent, they will not eaſily effect it, becauſe from the mildneſs of the climate, their general effeminacy, and other prevailing cauſes, the ſouthern Aſiatics, though ever ſo well verſed in arms, can never ſtand before Europeans, as the experience of all ages has told us; even the deſcendants of Europeans loſe the military virtue and proweſs of their anceſtors. We need only inſtance the deſcendants of thoſe Portugueſe who conquer-

ed the Eaſt—They proved as unable to reſiſt the Dutch, though equally ſkilful in arms, as the Aſiatics were to withſtand the proweſs of the anceſtors of thoſe now conquered in their turn.

Thus ſhould there ever be a general defection in the Eaſt, which we have no reaſon ever to expect, we may with ſome propriety ſuppoſe, that a leſs army than we now have in America, to bring our Colonies there to their due allegiance, would in the Eaſt bring about that effect.

The principal danger of loſing our eaſtern dominions would ariſe from ſome popular Vice-Roy wiſhing to render himſelf independent.

To prevent this as much as poſſible, we ſhould, though even irritated by the neighbouring powers, and neceſſitated to humble them, avoid the rage of conqueſt, and too great extenſion of dominion, for by reducing to our government the rivals of our eaſtern empire, who through jealouſy would be the imperial ſtate's allies in time of need, we ſhould, in caſe of revolt, have their whole accumulated force againſt us.

A farther prevention would be to divide our Indian territory into two or more governments, and to delegate the power of the Vice-Roys for ſhort periods only, not exceeding three or four years, and to perſons of the firſt rank and property in the imperial ſtate, who could have no inducement to wiſh to remain always abſent from their native-country. One half

of

of the Council might likewiſe be changed on each new appointment of a Vice-Roy, that power might not remain too long in the hands of any. Thus too, there would always remain people verſed in the government, and excepting the firſt remove, each appointment of Counſellors would hold their office for ſix or eight years, or during the reigns of two Vice-Roys.

From Bengal, Behar, Oriſſa, and the provinces that would be ceded, we may at firſt draw a revenue of three millions ſterling, which in a few years, from the acceſſion of inhabitants by the propoſed lenient government, would greatly increaſe.

The revenues of the Eaſt ariſe partly from cuſtoms or duties on the import, export, and tranſit of articles of trade, but chiefly from the rents of lands, which laſt, if the rents are within due bounds or not raiſed by monopoly, is the leaſt oppreſſive to the ſubject of any, becauſe it is no advantage to the farmer to pay his rent to an individual rather than to government; but, on the contrary, if the latter mode exempt him and his fellow-ſubject from taxes, the people at large are ſo far benefited. All that can be ſaid againſt this mode prevailing in Europe is, that wanting the intermediate power of the landed intereſt, the ſovereign would be without due controul, and the people would have no law but his will.

In

In India immutable juſtice requires, that the imperial ſtate ſhould exerciſe no more power than ſhe ought to do in other quarters of the globe; that is, that ſhe only enjoy their foreign navigation, the regulation of their commerce, and conſequent power of external duties, but not the right of internal taxes. From whence then the reader may ſay ſhall our revenues ariſe? From the rents of lands. But were the regulation of the rents entirely at the diſpoſal of government to raiſe them as they choſe, there would be no encouragement to induſtry; the people might be oppreſſed, and the empire ruined.

What we would propoſe, is a ſyſtem that would even admit of a powerful landed intereſt, and raiſe a revenue ſufficient.

The way the lands in Hindoſtan are commonly let by the ſub-farmers of the Nabobs and Rajas, is to receive half its produce. A high rent, even in England, if much labour is ſpent in the culture.

Bengal, &c. with the provinces ſuppoſed to be ceded, contain more than a ſquare of ten degrees in latitude, and as many in longitude; then computing a degree ſquare, in the parallel * of 30°, to contain 4000 † ſquare Engliſh

* The middle latitude of our Indian poſſeſſions is about 30° north, and in this latitude a degree of longitude is 52 geographic or 59·94 Engliſh miles.—A degree of lat. 60′, is 69 miles 288 yards = 69·16; therefore (59·94 × 69·16) 4145 ſquare Engliſh miles are a ſquare degree in the aforeſaid parallel.

† A ſquare mile contains 640 acres.

miles,

miles, or 2,560,000 acres, the whole will be two hundred and fifty-ſix millions of acres. Now a quit rent of 1s. per acre on the whole would produce upwards of twelve million pounds; but as mountains, deſerts, rivers, and highways, muſt occupy a conſiderable portion of the ſpace, and even great quantities of land capable of culture muſt have hitherto remained uncultivated, we will not calculate more than a hundred millions of acres likely for ſome time to be taken up on quit-rent, which, if in the courſe of a few years it could be made to average 2s. * per acre, would yield, without any burthen to the people, ten millions ſterling.

As to the mode of letting, I conceive the following plan would be as little oppreſſive, or liable to objection, as almoſt any other, viz. that tracts of land, not leſs than about 50 acres,

* It may be ſaid, why were not the quit-rents in America 2s. inſtead of from ½d. to 1½d. per acre?—The plain reaſon is, *land is only valuable in proportion to the number of its inhabitants, and thoſe in its vicinity:* therefore, as the number now in America bear a ſmall proportion to the ground that will admit of culture, it continues neceſſary to offer new lands almoſt for the taking up, that the encouragement may be ſufficient to invite ſettlers from diſtant countries. In Bengal, &c. the caſe is different; the country is already populous; there is no private property in lands, and great part of theſe, from being cultivated, are valuable; and being ſurrounded by populous nations, there is no doubt but by holding forth a mild government, new ſettlers will come in to take the lands on the terms preſcribed.

nor exceeding 200 by computation,* ſhould be put up by auction, and let to the higheſt bidder, on leaſes for ſeven years, but conditionally to be leaſes for ever, if on ſurvey the rents be found to equal or exceed the ſum of two rupees per acre. Thus, after the firſt ſeven years, there would be every year a general leaſe of lands that had been taken up ſeven years preceding, excepting thoſe that were then at or above two rupees; and all the lands would regularly riſe, till in the end, as the country increaſed in population, the whole of them that would admit of improvement would be at two rupees per acre quit-rent to the imperial ſtate, and would even then admit of a conſiderable intereſt to the proprietor, as two rupees per acre muſt fall far ſhort of half the produce, the general rent of land in Hindoſtan and many other parts of the world†.

The inhabitants of Bengal, before the famine, were eſtimated at twelve millions, and by that ſad cataſtrophe were ſuppoſed to be reduced near one-fourth; however, with the increaſe ſince then, they, with the inhabitants of the other provinces, cannot be leſs

* Small ſpaces for building ſhould be given gratis, or for a trivial acknowledgement, to be held in perpetuity—Houſes, though not lands (with ſome few exceptions) were permanent poſſeſſions, even in the time of the native princes.

† In Madeira and many other places, where a mode ſomewhat ſimilar is followed, the proprietor, as ſoon as the grapes are gathered and the wine is made, receives for his rent one-half of the latter.

than

than fifteen millions*, or twice the inhabitants of Great Britain†, ſo as the inhabitants of Britain, beſides other heavy taxes, are ſuppoſed to pay in rents of lands, twenty-four millions—twice the number in the Eaſt Indies, a country more abounding in riches, and as much in induſtry, might certainly pay with eaſe ten millions, the ſum ſuppoſed to be raiſed, were the preferable lands to average 2s. per acre—And as, from the new form of the conſtitution, and the opportunity afforded to rich men of veſting their fortunes in permanent poſſeſſions, inſtead of now keeping great part of their riches buried in the earth, or in jewels, the population of the Britiſh Indian empire might be doubled in a few periods of ſeven years, it does not ſeem improbable that the the whole of the hundred millions might, including the rents of the inferior lands, produce two rupees per acre, which, valuing the rupee as uſual at 2s. 6d. will produce twenty-five millions ſterling, a great ſum; but not much for thirty millions of people, eſpecially as it falls on the land, and can be no impediment to trade and induſtry—One-fifth of this revenue we will ſuppoſe muſt be ſpent in the country, to maintain the civil and military eſtabliſhments: thus four-fifths will remain to be drawn

* From the moſt probable accounts the number of inhabitants muſt be ſeveral millions more.

† England ſix millions, and Scotland one million and a half.

out, and this we ſhall be enabled to do by the vaſt induſtry of the inhabitants manufacturing and raiſing more than they can conſume, over and above paying the amount of their imports, the balance of which they receive in ſilver, not only from the European, but many Indian powers. We therefore might receive our revenue in our Indian imports, and the ſilver that Holland, France, &c. would otherwiſe have to export, the trouble and riſque of which would be ſaved to them, by exchanging it for government's bills on the treaſury of Bengal, &c.

There is one vulgar error militates with the idea of drawing a foreign revenue, and which we muſt endeavour to obviate, becauſe ſome men of ſenſe have adopted it. It is, that although a country may bear to pay heavy taxes, when theſe taxes are ſpent among themſelves, it cannot bear even a much ſmaller taxation when the produce of it is to be withdrawn and ſpent in another ſtate. This argument has its weight in a country ſo circumſtanced as not to have foreign demand for its ſurplus; but when on the contrary, as is the caſe with the Eaſt Indies and with *America*, the produce of its lands and of the induſtry of its inhabitants, are eagerly ſought after by other countries, the argument can have no force. For were the taxes of any country, ſay four or five millions, entirely ſpent at home, it muſt be ultimately in the produce

of

of the land and manufactures *, therefore ſo much the leſs muſt be exported; and would it not be the ſame if theſe articles ſo conſumed at home, to the amount of four or five millions, were ſold to foreigners, and the produce ſent to the governing power to expend where it might?

By what other means do the diſtant counties remit their taxes and rents to the capital where they are principally conſumed, but by ſelling the exceſs above what they uſe themſelves of their own produce and manufactures? It muſt, however, be owned, that a revenue ſpent where it is raiſed is ſo far of advantage, as that a home conſumption, when compleat, affords a better price, particularly in ſuch articles of the produce of the land as require, when not immediately conſumed, any preparation to keep them from decay.

The uſe to be made of this vaſt Indian revenue, as well as *all thoſe* which may be drawn *from any other dependent ſtates*, ſhould be in the determination of the whole legiſlative body, and granted by the Commons as the other ſupplies (except thoſe mortgaged for the intereſt of the national debt) now are,

* Part of both may, in many inſtances, be foreign, (particularly in Holland, and other ſmall populous ſtates) and in this caſe, it is evidently the ſame whether the expenders of the taxes conſume theſe articles at home or abroad, as an equivalent in either inſtance muſt be ſent out of the country to purchaſe them.

for one year only.—By theſe means, if bribery and corruption did not prevent it, in a ſhort time the debt of the nation might be cleared off, and the imperial ſtate exempted, except in caſes of neceſſity, from all taxes whatever; ſome few external duties neceſſary for the regulation of trade excepted.

The conſequence of this great influx of money, ſuppoſing the *import and export of proviſions were free*, could not enhance the price of theſe, or of wages, above the par of the neighbouring nations; but, if by theſe means we were exempted from taxes, would lower the rates ſo far that manufactures of all kinds would be cheaper in Britain, though overflowing with riches, than in any part of Europe beſides; conſequently there would ariſe the greater demand for them, and employment for the greater number of inhabitants, who no ſooner would be wanted than obtained; for who would not come to a country where liberty was enjoyed and no taxes paid; and what nation would dare to inſult a ſtate that had every reſource within itſelf, and could carry on the moſt expenſive war without feeling its weight?

This happy period, thoſe halcyon days, may by ſome be deemed never to exiſt but in the ideas of their projector, becauſe, ſay they, the corruption of human nature is ſuch, that the miniſters, aided with the great external revenue, will leſſen very little of our own internal

nal burthens, but apply the more to purpoſes of venality, and when they ſee fit, entirely overturn the conſtitution: Beſides, they may further urge, that even were the repreſentatives of the *people*, at ſuch time as the Indian revenue ſhould anſwer all the exigencies of the ſtate, to take ſufficient care to exempt *them* from all taxes, but thoſe neceſſary to regulate their commerce, the miniſter would have no occaſion to be beholden to the people for the annual ſupplies, and that the grant of the commons for its application would be but a farce. But if from the diſpoſition of the people, this grant ſhould even be found neceſſary, the miniſter would ſtill have a ſufficient fund of corruption to enſure compliance.

The weight of theſe objections muſt be acknowledged, and are indeed very powerful, but ſtill not inſurmountable, were the rotten boroughs ſtruck out of the conſtitution, the effects of bribery rendered uncertain, and the power of the Commons delegated for ſhorter periods.

All theſe might be effected by an eaſy change, an alteration no way complicated, by ordaining, that the repreſentatives of all boroughs whoſe voters do not exceed one thouſand * be elected by the county at large: That the votes for the election of repreſentatives, and on any diſputed queſtion in the

* Or any other definite number that may be found adviſeable.

houſe

houſe (when required by two or more members) ſhould be decided by ballot; and that the Commons ſhould be choſen only for one of their former periods, triennial or annual.

Theſe alterations would be no abſolute change of the conſtitution, and would not leſſen the power of any miniſter to forward the intereſt of his country.

How happy would be that King who ſhould thus conſult the good of his people! How revered would be his name to the lateſt poſterity! And how glorious would be that Miniſter who ſhould promote theſe virtuous ends!

FINIS.

AP-

APPENDIX.

ON

The MEANS of

EMANCIPATING SLAVES,

WITHOUT LOSS

TO THEIR

PROPRIETORS.

INSCRIBED

To the HOLDERS of

PLANTATIONS

IN THE

WEST INDIES

AND

Continent of America.

APPENDIX.

On the Manumiſſion of Slaves.

AS we have, in one of the preceding Sections, inveighed againſt the Americans for keeping their fellow-creatures in *perpetual ſlavery*, it becomes incumbent on us to point out ſome probable means whereby the ſervitude of the negroes may, like that of other men, be only for a ſhort time, and they in the end be free.

The chief and evident cauſe that militates againſt their liberation is, the unwillingneſs of men in general to give up any property or power they have attained: and to this we may add another, which prevents many perſons, even of humanity, from emancipating ſlaves, who perhaps have rendered them particular ſervices; it is, that the laws of the different Colonies require, that whoever frees his ſlave ſhall give ſecurity in a conſiderable ſum (which in Penſylvania is £. 30 currency) that the perſon freed ſhall never become chargeable to the public.

This law might be neceſſary to prevent men of ſordid diſpoſitions from liberating their ſlaves at a time when they became no longer

ſerviceable, when worn out by fatigue, and debilitated by age, their maintenance would become a charge to their proprietor. But then why ſhould they, whoſe generous ſpirit induce them to give their ſlaves freedom in the prime of life, be liable to any ſupport they may require in their old age, when the public has reaped the benefit of their labours, and their proportion of taxes, as much as of any other ſubjects, though different in colour? It might with equal reaſon be expected that every maſter ſhould be liable to the maintenance of his apprentice, ſhould he ever become chargeable to the public.

To obviate this bar to manumiſſion, the author * we have once before mentioned has laid down a plan, wherein he makes it appear that the ſum of 10s. (Penſylvania currency) paid (to a chamber appointed, or to the overſeers of the pariſh) for each year the age of the ſlave liberated exceeds 21, will ſufficiently indemnify the public. This ſum, accounting the exchange 150, will be 6s. 8d. ſterling.

In this eſtimate he ſuppoſes the negroes not in general to become chargeable till they attain the age of 60 years.

Now that a payment to a certain chamber of 6s. 8d. ſterling for every year the liberated negroe's age exceeds 21, will, with the accumulation of intereſt, be ſufficient in a general

* An Eſſay on the Expediency of the Abolition of Slavery, publiſhed in Burlington, New Jerſey, 1773.

practice

practice to maintain the whole that may become chargeable, we can have no doubt of; but as the propriety of this payment being thus regulated, carries no mathematical conviction with it, but on the contrary would be too great a payment at the middle ages, and too little at the extremes, we ſhall lay before our readers a method not liable to theſe objections, and at the ſame time ſhall go upon ſome data of this author's.

He obſerves that in Penſylvania, if any liberated negro become chargeable, his late proprietor or ſecurity is called upon for £. 30 currency, and if the charge exceed that ſum, it is born by the province, or in fact ariſes out of the ſurplus of theſe ſums, beyond the maintenance required for a great part of the negroes that have become chargeable: ſo that on experience it is found this ſum of £. 30 currency, or £. 20 ſterling (accounting the exchange at 150) paid on each negro becoming chargeable, is equal to the average charge of the whole. This being allowed it plainly follows, that the ſum which ſhould be paid on the liberation of a negro of any given age on a ſuppoſition, there was a certainty of his attaining the period of becoming chargeable, (before eſtimated to be at the age of 60 years) is ſuch an amount as would be equal to the receipt or payment of £. 20, at ſuch diſtance of time as his age falls ſhort of 60 years. But as the event of his attaining this

period, in which caſe only the money is to be paid, is uncertain: it is evident the ſum that ought to be paid muſt be compounded of theſe two events, that is, it muſt be ſo much leſs in proportion to the uncertainty of the party's attaining the age of 60.

Upon theſe principles the following table is calculated:

The probabilities of life in the Weſt Indies, and the ſouthern of our American Colonies, the former particularly, cannot be greater than they are in London; therefore we have taken them from one of the tables in the Appendix to Doctor Price's Obſervations on reverſionary payments.

The fourth column, or probability of being living at the age of 60 years, ariſes out of the preceding one, that is, as 147 out of the different numbers alive at the preceding ages, are living at the age of 60 years, 147 becomes the general numerator to each of theſe different numbers, which, uſed as denominators, give the probability a perſon of ſuch given age has of attaining or living beyond his ſixtieth year: the other columns need no further explanation than we have already given; but, as the ſums to be paid on liberation, in the lower and middle periods of life, appear very low, although the rate of intereſt we have ſuppoſed theſe to accumulate at is ſufficiently low to obviate any objection to its being compound, which the nature of calculations

culations for diſtant periods abſolutely require, this lowneſs will perhaps appear to be owing to our eſtimating the probability of life no higher than in London, which, however, we cannot help again obſerving, is certainly equal or ſuperior to that of the negroes in our plantations abroad.

To ſhew thoſe who may differ from us in this opinion, that the ſums at theſe periods would not have been greatly more had we even calculated according to the probabilities of life at Breſlaw, or followed Mr. de Moivre's hypotheſis, we have given by way of note what ſums, according to theſe, would be required for the ages of 21, 35, and 50.

According to the probabilities of life at Breſlau *.

21	39	592	·4088	·2166	·0885	1	15	4
35	25	490	·4939	·3751	·1851	3	14	—
50	10	346	·6965	·6755	·4704	9	8	2
60	—	242	—	—	—	—	—	—

According to De Moivre's hypotheſis.

21	39	65	·4000	·2166	·0866	1	14	7
35	25	51	·5098	·3751	·1912	3	16	6
50	10	36	·7222	·6755	·4878	9	15	1
60	—	26	—	—	—	—	—	—

* For the titles of the above columns, ſee thoſe corresponding in the next page.

Age of the slave to be liberated.	Complement of his age, or No. of years short of 60.	Persons living at different ages, according to probabilities of life in London.	Probability of being living at the age of 60 years.	Present value of £.1 to be paid on the expiration of the complement of any given life from 60, discontinuing at the rate of £.4 per cent. compound interest.	Value of £.1 to be paid conditionally on the attaining the full age of 60 years.	Value of £.10 to be paid on the same conditions.
21	39	487	·3018	·2166	·0652	1 6 1
22	38	479	·3068	·2253	·0691	1 7 7
23	37	471	·3121	·2343	·0731	1 9 3
24	36	463	·3175	·2436	·0773	1 10 10
25	35	455	·3231	·2534	·0818	1 12 8
26	34	447	·3311	·2635	·0872	1 14 10
27	33	439	·3348	·2741	·0917	1 16 8
28	32	431	·3410	·2850	·0971	1 18 10
29	31	422	·3516	·2964	·1042	2 1 8
30	30	413	·3559	·3083	·1097	2 3 10
31	29	404	·3638	·3206	·1166	2 6 7
32	28	395	·3721	·3335	·1241	2 9 7
33	27	386	·3808	·3462	·1318	2 12 8
34	26	377	·3899	·3607	·1406	2 16 3
35	25	368	·3994	·3751	·1498	2 19 11
36	24	359	·4094	·3901	·1597	3 3 10
37	23	350	·4200	·4057	·1703	3 8 1
38	22	341	·4310	·4219	·1818	3 12 8
39	21	332	·4427	·4388	·1942	3 17 8
40	20	322	·4568	·4564	·2084	4 3 4
41	19	312	·4711	·4746	·2236	4 9 5
42	18	302	·4867	·4936	·2402	4 16 1
43	17	292	·5034	·5134	·2584	5 3 4
44	16	282	·5212	·5339	·2782	5 11 3
45	15	272	·5404	·5552	·3000	6 — —
46	14	262	·5610	·5775	·3240	6 9 7
47	13	252	·5833	·6006	·3503	7 — 1
48	12	242	·6074	·6246	·3793	7 11 8
49	11	233	·6309	·6496	·4098	8 3 11
50	10	224	·6562	·6755	·4432	8 17 3
51	9	215	·6558	·7026	·4606	9 4 3
52	8	206	·7135	·7307	·5213	10 8 6
53	7	198	·7424	·7599	·5641	11 5 7
54	6	190	·7736	·7903	·6113	12 4 6
55	5	183	·8032	·8219	·6601	13 4 —
56	4	176	·8352	·8548	·7139	14 5 6
57	3	169	·8698	·8890	·7732	15 19 3
58	2	162	·9074	·9245	·8388	16 15 6
59	1	155	·9483	·9615	·9117	18 4 8
60	—	147	1·	1·	1·	20 — —

What we would now wiſh to propoſe is, that the government of each iſland or province ſhould take upon them the future maintenance that may be neceſſary for every ſlave, free of bodily infirmities, hereafter to be liberated, on condition of there being paid into their treaſury, ſuch ſums as ought to be according to their reſpective ages. As to the age of the party, where it can, it ought to be proved indubitably; but where it cannot, to be then determined by ſkilful perſons appointed by a magiſtrate, who, from what evidence they could gather, and from appearances, might fix it to the beſt of their judgment.

However, until ſuch time as the emancipated negroes fall further under the conſideration of the reſpective governments, it is eaſy for individuals who make them free, or afford them the means of doing it, to take ſuch equivalent into their own hands, and in conſequence engage to maintain them when they can no longer do it by their own labour; that is, to take them again into their own plantations as ſoon as they require it, and there maintain them, reaping the benefit of ſuch little employment as they are capable of—All this being premiſed, it will be eaſy to form a plan of emancipation that ſhall be fraught with no detriment to the proprietors of ſlaves.

If I am informed right, it is a cuſtom in ſome of the Spaniſh ſettlements, that whenever a cargo of ſlaves arrives, the price each in-

individual ſells at is regiſtered in one of their courts, and his purchaſer is obliged to allow him (or her) one day for himſelf out of the ſix allotted for labour, by which they ſecure to him the means of becoming free; for when, by making proper uſe of this day, he acquires what is equal to one-fifth of his purchaſe, his maſter is obliged to ſell him one day out of the remaining five; then the ſlave being maſter of two days, with the ſame liberty of purchaſing the others one by one, has it in his power to make a rapid progreſs in becoming free.

Shall the Engliſh, ever famed for courage and humanity which always go hand in hand, be out done in the latter by a nation in many inſtances notorious for cruelty?

Let not they who boaſt of their own freedom, and ſhould entertain elevated notions of liberty, be greater tyrants and oppreſſors of their fellow-creatures than the ſubjects of a deſpotic monarch are.

This mode of emancipation, I am ſenſible, will meet with oppoſition from all thoſe, who, inſenſible of the rights of human nature any further than relates to themſelves, are wont to look upon their negroes as indiſputably their property as their horſes or dogs, becauſe, they will ſay, although in the end the negro pays us the whole of his purchaſe money, from whence is his ability of doing it derived, but from our previouſly giving up our right to one day in the ſix; therefore, we in fact

libe-

liberate him without any real conſideration, becauſe, had we retained the labour of that day to our own uſe, we ſhould not only have been in poſſeſſion of the money paid us for his freedom, or of his labour which was equivalent, as it acquired it, but likewiſe have been entituled to all his future ſervice. This mode of argument is plauſible enough, did we not conſider that a man working for himſelf, conſcious the produce of his labour is his own, and to be applied to effectuate what the human mind, if not broken with ſlavery and deſpair, muſt ardently deſire—his liberty and a proſpect of future competence, will be inclined to exert himſelf to a much greater degree, than if an intolerant taſk-maſter was to reap the whole fruits of his labour; not only ſo, but theſe hopes of better days, would, in all probability, ſo invigorate and add life and ſpirit to him, that when labouring for his maſter, he would do more, or if taſk-work execute it better than he otherwiſe would have done.

However, the plan of liberation we have to propoſe, is without thoſe objections; it is, that every proprietor ſhould encourage his negro to ſave money, which may be done by various means—by paying him proportionately for working above his taſk-work—by allowing him, where land is plentiful, to cultivate at his leiſure hours, a ſpot of ground for himſelf, and by purchaſing the produce of him at

its full value, if no other market be near—likewiſe by other means that particular ſituations and circumſtances may point out:—And when the negro has acquired what is equal to one-ſixth part of his value or coſt, to ſell him one-ſixth of his time, that is, one day in the week—Then by the ſame encouragement and paying him for the free day the uſual hire, or allowing him to work elſewhere, he will, in due time, be enabled to purchaſe another — He will now, beſides his leiſure hours, be maſter of two days, and may, therefore, in little more than half the time, purchaſe a third.

We will ſtop here, and take time to obſerve, that as the poſſibility of a ſlave's acquiring wherewith to purchaſe the firſt day is only derived from his leiſure hours, it would be nothing more than humanity dictates to ſell him a leſſer portion, that is, on the payment of a twenty-fourth of his value, to allow him one day in the month, or four weeks, which he may make uſe of, as we have before provided, to enable him by three other ſuch payments and purchaſes to acquire the more ſpeedily the property of one day in the week, with which, to proceed as we have mentioned, to the acquiring of other two days. Now his proprietor being only maſter of half his time, it will not be amiſs, as he is obliged by the laws to give ſecurity for the maintenance of his ſlave liberated, ſhould he ever become charge-

chargeable, that he ſecure himſelf from that burthen, by retaining * one day as ſecurity for that purpoſe, by making the remaining half-purchaſe of the ſlave chargeable, in equal payments for the liberty of the two next days; theſe payments made, nothing in juſtice or reaſon ſhould retard the negro being wholly free, but the payment to his late proprietor (who now becomes his bondſman to the public) of an equivalent to the probability of his becoming a charge in his old age. This equivalent ought to be paid in hand, but ſhould the freed man take a very conſiderable time, it can be no loſs to the bondſman, as the retention of one day's labour in the week will (except in very advanced ages) be equal or ſuperior to the intereſt and riſk of not being paid, and we may ſuppoſe a ſufficient ſpur to the negro, to procure and pay the ſum wanted.

After ſlaves, male or female, by their own induſtry have thus emancipated themſelves, their children or near connections may poſſibly

* This day might be equally retained by allowing the negro to purchaſe the remaining three days as he did the other, viz. by paying only one-ſixth of his value for each; but then as the abſolute freedom of the laſt day could not be had without the payment likewiſe of the equivalent, to the proſpect of his future maintenance, which in ſlaves of advanced ages would be ſo conſiderable, that joined to one-ſixth of their value to be previouſly paid, ſuch negro might think it much more than one day of the week was worth, and conſequently content himſelf with paying his maſter five-ſixths of his value, to purchaſe five days in the ſix, and ſo leave him liable, and without due recompence, to maintain him in his old age.

yet remain in ſlavery—The liberty of theſe they ſhould be allowed to purchaſe in the ſame manner as they have done their own: juſtice requires it, and humanity will permit no man to refuſe ſelling the children to their father. As to the value to be fixed upon individuals of different ages and degrees of utility, there is no preſcribing any general rule: this will lay in the breaſt of the proprietor; and as no perſon will adopt this ſcheme without ſome degree of humanity, or of juſtice, we may hope the ſame feelings will direct him to eſtimate with equity.

It may be ſaid that no plantation can be carried on with regularity, without an equal number of hands to labour on every working day in the week, which cannot be, when the ſlaves have purchaſed the freedom of certain days; however, this we preſume can produce no ſuch inconvenience, as without labour, the ſlaves can have procured no liberty at all, nor can procure any further; and where can they labour to more advantage than in the plantation they reſide on: ſo that all the difference is, they muſt be paid or allowed on thoſe days, the uſual wages of the country, which is no hardſhip to the maſter, as he has received an equivalent in value to this day, and may be eaſily determined, as there are in every iſland and province ſome free negroes who work for hire; and in the iſlands particularly, many ſlaves belonging to proprietors who have no

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plantations, but let their negroes out to labour for others.

It may be as well not to make the firſt weekly day of liberation for every one the ſame; but if with one part the Monday ſhould be begun with, to proceed regularly forward; the other part might begin at and proceed from Thurſday: thus when twenty ſlaves in two parties had each procured the freedom of three days, the want of their labour would be preciſely the ſame as that of ten ſlaves made perfectly free: and the ſum they will have paid, will be equal to the whole value or coſt of ten ſuch negroes; therefore, their proprietor has it in his power to purchaſe ten more, and with this advantage, that without any increaſe of capital he is enabled to have ten more negroes upon his plantation, and conſequently an increaſe of produce in that proportion: for this acceſſion of produce he will have undoubtedly labourers' wages to pay; but then theſe wages will not be near equal to the advantage gained, for in the other inſtances no one would hire men, but with the deſign of gaining by their labour.

It now becomes matter of enquiry, whether it would not be better, where both are equally to be had, to hire freemen or to labour with ſlaves. To the man of ſmall capital the former choice is obvious, becauſe, with only as much as will pay wages till the getting in of his firſt crop, he may cultivate his lands

to

to as great an extent as thoſe who have many times his capital, and though his gains will not be ſo great as thoſe that have no labour to pay, they will be much greater on the capital employed; and this is certainly the criterion to go by.

Now, as to the man of large capital, we may venture to ſay, he will not value an annuity on the life of any new ſlave at eight years purchaſe, equal to legal intereſt for his money: therefore, as good ſlaves, on an average, are worth £. 50 * ſterling per head, and good mechanics are, many of them, bought and ſold as high as £. 100, it would be equally his intereſt to hire the former at £. 6 . 5, yearly wages, with all neceſſary cloathing and proviſions, and the latter at £. 12 . 10, with the ſame allowances, as to purchaſe them.

It would even be better, becauſe the planter would be under no engagement to maintain the hired men in their old age. Theſe wages and other attendants, are, in reality, as much, or more, than are uſually paid in many parts of England for farmers' ſervants and country mechanics. And is there no difference between the labour of a freeman and a ſlave? Yes, reaſon tells us there muſt be: The one

* Slaves from ſome part of the coaſt (where they are of leſs value) may be bought on importation at ſo low as about £. 36 per head, provided men and women, with a conſiderable proportion of boys and girls of 12 years of age and upwards, be taken together as they run, with a right only of refuſal of one in fifteen or twenty.

is ſtimulated by the conſciouſneſs of greater gain—the other has no ſuch motive; for let his labour be more or leſs it matters not to him, he is not intereſted in his maſter's welfare.

To ſpur the ſlave on to activity, cuſtom has appointed, in all labours that will admit of it, a certain taſk for a day's work: This work, becauſe it muſt, will in ſome manner be done; but then with a degree of languor and liſtleſſneſs whether it be ill or well executed, and not with that ſpirit and eaſe, or to ſuch extent, that a freeman, certain of reaping an encreaſed pay proportionate to his induſtry, would do.

Men, conſcious of being free, will, even for moderate wages, engage themſelves in labours that appear the moſt intolerable to ſlaves; for what is worſe than working in lead, coal, or tin-mines? And we may boldly aſſert, that it is more the intereſt of the employers of theſe men to pay them in proportion to their induſtry*, than to purchaſe them (if it was in their power) at £.50 or £.60 per head, the price of ſeaſoned ſlaves, and to find them with proviſions and cloaths.

From theſe premiſes it will follow, that *ſtate policy*, which requires labour to be low, is not repugnant to the emancipation of ſlaves; but, on the contrary, is intereſted in it, and particularly ſo, if by their own induſtry they have reimburſed their value; for then *they muſt*

* By the meaſure or quantity of their work.

either

either be looked on as an acceſſion of ſo many ſubjects, or as the means of ſuch a national acquiſition of property as they have paid for their emancipation: which increaſe of capital in proper hands, in a commercial nation, will always be turned to its advantage.

Had the labour of the negroes in our iſlands been voluntary, we never ſhould have heard of their frequent inſurrections and murder of their maſters—nor of theſe bloody wars at different times, for near a century paſt, with the runaway negroes in Jamaica, whom at laſt we have been obliged to acknowledge independent.

We do not mean to infer that proprietors of ſlaves ſhould free them without recompence, becauſe this act of generoſity, to the diminution of their own fortunes, can with no more reaſon be expected of them than that other individuals ſhould apply their private property to the ſame purpoſe—to the reimburſement of the ſums they coſt their proprietors.

What we wiſh to have adopted is, to look on the coſt or value of a negro as a debt due from him, for which we retain his labour as ſecurity for principal and intereſt, and to put the payment of it as much as poſſible in his power by permitting him to pay it off as he is able, and gradually redeem his own; which is no more indulgence than we would readily allow any other debtor. Should we not think

think that creditor a cruel one, who having received from a poor man, his debtor, an aſſignment of ſix horſes, being all the effects he was worth, as ſecurity and intereſt for the debt from their value and labour, ſhould refuſe the redemption of the horſes one by one; but, becauſe he knew he had an advantageous bargain, ſhould inſiſt upon the poor man's redeeming them altogether, if at all: an event never likely to be in his power; although, had he been ſuffered to redeem them one by one, he would ſoon, by the profit gradually accruing and accumulating from their additional labour, have effectuated the redemption of the whole.

This creditor we ſhould think cruel, and yet that man, if ſuch there be, would be more ſo, who ſhould refuſe his ſlave the purchaſing the ſix weekly days of labour one by one.

Men thus made free, would have in them the ſpirit of induſtry, and, as we have before concluded, would voluntarily labour for as much more than meat and neceſſaries, as the life annuity of their value and proſpect of future maintenance would be worth, excluſive of the additional labour, which, as free men intereſted in it, they would give.

Theſe wages, though equally advantageous to the employer to give, as to purchaſe the labourer, would enable the latter to live in a degree of enjoyment of wants, real or imagi-

nary, ſo much ſuperior to a ſlave, as would ſtimulate this claſs, to attain the condition of freemen.

Were great part of our negro labourers free, and a probability, or the means afforded to all of becoming ſo, we ſhould have nothing to fear from inſurrections: But ſhould we ſtill continue the ſyſtem of keeping our fellow-creatures in *perpetual ſlavery*, what have we not to expect from that juſtly enraged part of our ſpecies?

In Jamaica, St. Domingo, and Dutch Guiana theſe oppreſſed men have vindicated the rights of nature—in deſpite of their tyrants have become free, and formed republics ſo formidable, that their former maſters were glad to acknowledge their independency, on condition to be freed from their inroads and depredations, and that they receive into their community no others of their ſable race, but deliver them to their maſters.

Without a new mode of conduct, we ſhall certainly ſome day ſee as powerful an inſurrection, and as formidable a colony of negroes, in the faſtneſſes of the Apalachian Mountains, as now is in Guiana, St. Domingo, or the Blue Mountains of Jamaica.

As the negroes in Virginia, the Carolinas and Georgia exceed the whites ſo far in numbers, nothing hitherto has prevented this event but the great antipathy the Indians bear this unfortunate race, and the better treat-

treatment of the negroes as to food, from the greater plenty of it, which leſſens their incitement to riſe.

However, this antipathy of the Indians, which is the chief barrier to inſurrections, may ceaſe; but whether it do or no, it will ſhortly be of little moment, as theſe aboriginal Americans, ſince the introduction of European vices, have been, and ſtill are, greatly on the decreaſe; while, on the contrary, the negroes, even by their natural increaſe *, are becoming more and more numerous, and probably after theſe troubles are ſubſided, will be increaſed ſtill further by importations. Therefore ſhould we continue to keep nearly the whole race as ſlaves, and not encourage and aſſiſt them to liberate themſelves, the epocha of their univerſal freedom, and ruin of their preſent maſters, may be at no very diſtant period.

* This increaſe would be ſtill greater, did not the inhumanity of ſome of their maſters allow no remiſſion of labour to the females, during the latter part of their pregnancy.

ERRATA.

Page 6 l. 20 and 22 It is plain it cannot, *read* it is plain cannot.
8 31 manufactures, *read* manufacturers.
21 24 coloniſts, *read* the coloniſts. Line 39, *dele* be.
26 16 land, *read* 'land (*abbreviation of Newfoundland*)
29 24 foward, *read* forward. Page 39, line 19 until, *read* untill.
43 23 cavil about the right, *read* diſpute the right. *And in the following line, immediately after* do ſo, *read* They then came into non-importation agreements, as they had done before for the repeal of the ſtamp-act, and ſuch now was the lenieney or want of firmneſs in the government, that the ſame cauſes produced the ſame effect, and the act, except in the article of tea, on which was laid a duty of 3d. per lb. was repealed.
The laſt line of the ſame page, preamble to the forementioned act ſets forth, *read* preambles to the forementioned act, and the 4 G. III. chap. 15. (laying a duty on foreign ſugars, indigo, coffee, wines, &c. &c.) ſet forth.
61 28 thing, read think.
72 19 if the former, *read* if the produce of the colonies.
79 24 little chance, *read* little chance of
84 8 even, *read* ever.
102 22 not much to be, *read* not to be.
110 9 were not below, *read* were below.
121 18 *dele* the.
134 *Title of the 5th column*, diſcontinuing, *read* diſcounting.

☞ The Reader is deſired particularly to attend to the *Errata* in p. 43.

A R Smith May 20 1879 XAS